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The two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the U.S. military 
must be prepared to conduct foreign security force assistance missions as a major element 
of the U.S. national security strategy. This thesis is a study of the United States’ attempt 
to build strong central armies in Iraq and Afghanistan in the midst of a larger nation-
building effort. Following the collapse of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes, the 
U.S. military was tasked to rebuild the national armies of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the 
departure of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 and the withdrawal of combat advisors from 
Afghanistan in 2014, the Islamic State has gained control of significant territory in Iraq 
including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, while the Taliban and the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant–Khorasan control 30 percent of Afghan districts. The purpose of this 
thesis is to explain why, despite $60 billion and more than a decade of military advisory 
efforts, the Iraqi and Afghan national armies are not unified sustainable forces loyal to 
the central government and capable of defending their territories from internal and 
external threats. There are four key premises as to why the Iraqi and Afghan armies have 
not met the expectations of a sustainable and legitimate central army: failure to achieve 
legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation and will to fight, creation of an army in the 
Western image rather than an army that meets the needs of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
lack of a long-term U.S. strategy and commitment. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain why, despite $60 billion and more than a 
decade of military advisory efforts, the Iraqi and Afghan national armies are not unified 
sustainable forces loyal to the central government and capable of defending their 
territories from internal and external threats. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the U.S. military 
must be prepared to conduct foreign security force assistance missions as a major element 
of the U.S. national security strategy. Following the collapse of the Taliban and Saddam 
Hussein regimes, the U.S. military was tasked to rebuild the national armies of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The growth of the Islamic State in Iraq since 2014 has 
demonstrated that the Iraqi Army has been unable to establish and maintain security and 
stability throughout the entire country following the departure of U.S. forces. Limited 
success against the Islamic State in Iraq has been as a result of a mix of Shi’a and Sunni 
militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, Iraqi Army, and coalition air power, not a unified Iraqi 
Army under the control of the Iraqi central government.1 In Afghanistan, as of January 
2016, 71% of the country’s districts are under Afghan government control leaving the 
other 29% to be under control or influence of insurgent groups, chiefly the Taliban or the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant–Khorasan (ISIL-K).2 The ability of the Afghanistan 
National Army to provide security and stability in the absence of U.S. and coalition 
forces will be further demonstrated as the mission in Afghanistan continues to wind 
down. Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) General John Campbell and 
National Intelligence Director James Clapper have both concluded that continued fighting 
                                                 
1 Patrick Martin et al., “Iraq Control of Terrain Map: February 9, 2016,” Institute for the Study of War, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/
Iraq%20Blobby%20map%2009%20FEBRUARY%202016.pdf. 
2 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, January 30, 2016 (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2016), 69, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
quarterlyreports/2016-01-30qr.pdf. 
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and a deteriorating security situation will make 2016 a worse year than 2015 in 
Afghanistan.3 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The significance of the research question is to gain a better understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations of what can be achieved through the military advisory mission 
to build, train, equip, and support the sustainment of a partnered foreign military in the 
achievement of U.S. national security objectives. Facilitating the security of our allies 
and partners around the world has been an enduring task of our national security decision 
makers dating back more than a century. In his article, “Helping Others Defend 
Themselves,” former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote: “Helping other countries 
better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global 
leadership and a critical part of protecting U.S. security, as well. Improving the way the 
U.S. government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.”4 
Throughout the last century, the U.S. military has learned and relearned the tremendously 
challenging and complex mission of military advising. The U.S. military has 
demonstrated exceptional innovation when faced with new challenges that requires the 
skillset of the military advisor. However, the U.S. military must gain a better 
understanding of the mission of foreign security force through a thorough analysis of the 
deficit between the expectation of what can be achieved and the actual outcome of 
foreign security force capability and capacity. The U.S. military’s role in foreign security 
force assistance will continue to be an enduring mission as a large part of the U.S. 
national security strategy. 
The doctrine of the military advisor and foreign security force assistance was a 
key element of the U.S. and coalition force’s mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Building, training, equipping, and supporting the Iraqi and Afghan national armies to 
                                                 
3 Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, 114th 
Cong., 2 (2016) (statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), 2, 
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf. 
4 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2010): 11. 
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assume the lead responsibility of security was a critical element of the U.S. strategy in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan. The doctrine of the military advisor and foreign security force 
assistance reflects the importance of political, as well as military development. Joint 
Publication 3–22: Foreign Internal Defense states that “the construct of an Internal 
Defense and Development (IDAD) program should integrate security force and civilian 
actions into a comprehensive effort.”5 Joint Publication 3–22 further states that “military 
activities in support of Foreign Internal Defense requirements are integrated into concepts 
and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level.”6 
Building the capacity of our partners and allies through foreign security force 
advisory and assistance programs is a critical element of our national security strategy 
and the mission of the U.S. Department of Defense. In the 2015 National Security 
Strategy, President Barack Obama wrote: “The United States will build the capacity of 
the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally. Working with 
Congress, we will train and equip local partners and provide operational support to gain 
ground against terrorist groups.”7 The importance of building the capacity of our allies 
and partners through security force assistance and military advising in the President’s 
National Security Strategy has been echoed in the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) 
since they began being published in 1997. In the 2010 QDR, one of the key initiatives in 
shaping the force was that we will build the capacity of partner states. The QDR stated 
that a key initiative was to institutionalize and reform security force assistance in the 
general purpose force.8 Building partner nation capacity was further stated in the 2015 
Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Planning Guidance. The Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, General Joseph Dunford, wrote: “Building partner nation capacity is a key 
capability of forward-deployed MAGTFs (Marine Air Ground Task Force) and we must 
clearly define our capabilities and determine our institutional capacity for what is an 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense, Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication 3–22 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2010), xi. 
6 Ibid., xvii. 
7 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 9. 
8 Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Briefing (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2010), slide 7. 
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increasingly important component of the National Defense Strategy.” In his article titled 
“A Balanced Strategy,” former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates underscored the 
importance of building the capacity of our partner governments and their security forces 
to support U.S. national security interests: 
Where possible, U.S. strategy must employ indirect approaches—
primarily through building the capacity of governments and their security 
forces—to prevent festering problems form turning into crisis that require 
costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, 
the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as 
important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important 
as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.9 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major problem addressed by this thesis is to explain why, despite $60 billion 
and more than a decade of military advisory efforts, the Iraqi and Afghan national armies 
are not unified, sustainable forces loyal to the central government and capable of 
defending their territories from internal and external threats. There are two hypotheses 
that can be formulated by a comparison of the U.S. military’s efforts to rebuild the 
national armies of Iraq and Afghanistan. The first hypothesis is that the failures of the 
Iraqi and Afghan armies are a result of insufficient doctrine and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) to select, train, organize, deploy, and employ combat advisors to 
partnered foreign security forces. The second hypothesis predicts that the failures of the 
Iraqi and Afghan armies is due to the internal domestic situation within those countries 
and a failure of the U.S. government and military to develop a strategy without a 
thorough understanding of the historical context, cultural landscape, resources, 
capabilities, and limitations of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Both of these hypotheses have important implications for the U.S. military in 
preparing for future conflicts. The military advisor mission will continue to be an 
important task that the U.S. military will be required to perform in support of our partners 
and allies to achieve our national security objectives. According to the National Security 
Strategy of the United States, the U.S. military will continue to provide training, 
                                                 
9 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009). 
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equipment, and operational support to improve the capabilities and capacities of our 
partners to combat terrorism.10 If the first hypothesis is correct, the U.S. military must 
conduct a thorough review of the doctrine and TTPs for the selection, training, and 
deployment of military advisors. If the second hypothesis is correct, the U.S. military 
must be able to use the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as a framework to fully 
understand the importance of history, cultural landscape, resources, capabilities, and 
limitations and its importance in the development of a military strategy. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis evaluates the U.S. military’s approach to the development of Iraqi and 
Afghan national armies. The thesis develops hypotheses to explain the deficit between 
the expectation of what could be achieved and the actual outcome in the development of 
Iraqi and Afghan security force capability and capacity. The outcome of this research can 
help explain how the U.S. military can better conduct the military advising mission in 
support of building partner nation capacity in the Middle East. In addition to a 
comparative analysis of the mission to re-build the Iraqi and Afghan national armies, this 
thesis will evaluate national security strategy and Department of Defense strategic 
documents to formulate how the U.S. military’s military advising mission can better 
support the national security strategy and the objective of building partner nation 
capability and capacity. 
The 9/11 attacks resulted in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 
2003. Though both Iraq and Afghanistan had very different regimes, militaries, and 
security forces, they are both similar in that following the toppling of the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan and the Saddam regime in Iraq, the countries were both left with a 
vacuum of any semblance of forces to provide security. In late 2001, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command would provide support and 
operate alongside the Northern Alliance to capture Kabul and Kandahar and topple the 
Taliban regime leaving virtually no security forces to support the new Hamid Karzai 
                                                 
10 White House, National Security Strategy, 9.  
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government.11 Following the successful invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the Saddam 
regime in 2003, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), L. Paul Bremer 
signed CPA Order Number 1 and 2. CPA Order 1 would direct the de-Ba’athification of 
Iraqi society and sought to prevent members of Saddam’s Ba’ath Party from returning to 
positions of power in the new Iraqi government. CPA Order 2 would direct the 
disbandment of the old Iraqi Security Forces.12 CPA 1 and 2 would leave Iraq with no 
government leadership or security forces other than that of U.S. and coalition forces. 
During the campaign in Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces would be charged with 
rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from scratch following the collapse of the 
Saddam Hussein regime and the disbandment of the old Iraqi Army. During the planning 
for the invasion of Iraq, the assumption was made that the Iraqi security forces would 
capitulate and be available to be reorganized to support law enforcement and security 
missions following the fall of the Saddam regime.13 Following the toppling of the 
Saddam regime, there would be no security forces to fill the void and help establish 
security and stability in Iraq. U.S. and coalition forces would be tasked with rebuilding 
all Iraqi security forces from scratch, including both the army and the police. In 2004, the 
coalition forces would establish the Multi National Security Transition Command–Iraq 
(MNSTC-I) with the mission to pull all elements of the ISF training mission under one 
command.14 In 2005, MNSTC-I would gain the additional responsibility to mentor and 
provide assistance in building the capacity of the Ministries of Defense and Interior.15 
The goal of the ISF training mission was to facilitate the training of ISF to enable 
transition of security responsibilities to Iraqis. MNSTC-I would be tasked with providing 
trainers and advisors from the institutional level at the Ministries of Defense and Interior 
all the way down to the tactical level at the Iraqi battalions. 
                                                 
11 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: 
Basic, 2002), 338. 
12 Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, 339. 
13 Catherine Marie Dale, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for 
Congress (CRS Report No. RL34387) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 59, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101771.pdf. 
14 Ibid., 62. 
15 Ibid., 63. 
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Throughout the ISF training mission in Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces would 
encounter a number of similar challenges. Among these challenges would be that 
operations at the tactical level would improve dramatically in a very short period of time, 
but the logistics and upper echelon planning capabilities at the ministerial levels could 
not survive the departure of U.S. advisors and the loss of U.S. influence at the political 
level.16 Another challenge noted was after the departure of U.S. advisors, the ISF 
reverted back to the military culture of the Saddam era rather than accept the U.S. model 
under which they had been trained by U.S. and coalition advisors.17 Reversion to the old 
Iraqi military culture resulted in two major outcomes that would limit the effectiveness of 
the ISF: increased divisions within the ISF along sectarian, ethnic, and tribal lines rather 
than allegiance to the state and the military chain of command and increasing centralized 
command and control that was not conducive to independent security operations.18 
Beginning in 2004, the U.S. military was tasked with building the Iraqi Army 
from scratch. The U.S. military provided advisor teams to train, mentor, and advise the 
Iraqi Army from the battalion-level to the division-level.19 These advisors “participated 
in a wide variety of activities—from advising their counterparts on administrative 
procedures to patrolling with them in Iraqi streets.”20 As the Iraqi Army became more 
and more capable of independent operations, the advisor team’s mission evolved. The 
advisor teams at the battalion level focused more on staff functions, logistical support and 
planning, and command and control.21 At the brigade and division levels, the advisor 
teams focused on high-level staff functions, leadership, and sustainment of their 
subordinate forces.22 
                                                 
16 Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, and Daniel Dewit, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 11. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 William Rosenau et al., United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future 
(Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2013), 35. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 36. 
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The advisory and assistance mission in Afghanistan would be similar to that of 
Iraq in the building of security forces from scratch; however, the key difference was that 
there were no professional standing security forces or army in Afghanistan before the fall 
of the Taliban regime. Samuel Chan, in “Sentinel’s for Afghan Democracy,” wrote: 
“Afghanistan has not had a national army since its fragmentation and subsequent 
disintegration after the collapse of Dr. Mohammed Najibullah’s Soviet-backed regime in 
1992.”23 The history of Afghanistan over the past century includes four instances of total 
disintegration of the military due to foreign invasion or civil war.24 Throughout the 
history of Afghanistan, the government relied on tribal militia augmentation into the 
national army to fight foreign invasion or domestic disturbance.25 The process of forming 
a professional standing military was severely limited by the tribal and ethnic schism 
within Afghan society. Ali Jalalai, former Afghan Army Colonel and top military planner 
with the resistance movement to the Soviet invasion, stated that “primacy of tribal and 
local loyalty among the soldiers impaired the army’s commitment to the government’s 
cause.”26 The integration of the tribal militias into the Afghanistan security force 
structure would be a major challenge for U.S. and coalition forces in building a national 
army. 
The first common challenge faced by all military advisory efforts was the 
selection of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to be assigned as advisors. Retired 
Lieutenant Colonel James Willbanks, the Director of the Department of Military History 
at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and advisor in Vietnam in 1971, 
provided a summary of the literature on selection of military advisors. Willbanks wrote, 
Part of establishing a viable and effective advisory effort is selecting and 
training the right personnel to meet the unique demands of the advisory 
mission; not everyone has the training, experience, maturity, temperament 
to be an effective advisor. The selection of officers and non-commissioned 
                                                 
23 Samuel Chan, “Sentinels for Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army” (working paper, S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 2007), 2. 
24 Ali A. Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army,” Parameters 32, no. 3 (autumn 2002): 72. 
25 Ibid., 73. 
26 Ibid., 74. 
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officers to be advisors must involve a conscious policy to find the right 
personnel to fill these critical assignments.27 
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the selection of advisors would vary 
widely. The U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all contributed forces in 
support of the military advisory mission. To limit the scope of this thesis, research on the 
selection, training, and deployment of the Marine Corps advisors was chosen. The 
literature supports that although the Marine Corps made attempts to assign the right 
Marines to advisor billets, the large number of advisor billets and competing combat 
deployment requirements demanded in Iraq and Afghanistan did not always make this 
possible. The Center for Naval Analysis study on U.S. Marine Corps advisors stated that 
“the USMC struggled with how to screen for and impart ‘soft skills’ needed to be 
successful as a foreign military advisor…the 3d MARDIV (3rd Marine Division) looked 
for advisors with good interpersonal skills, the ability to build enduring relationships, and 
a proven track record in training and instruction.”28 The author’s own experience in 
selection of military advisors was that they would largely be drawn simply from those 
that were available. The selection and assignment of Marines to advisor missions would 
be based on tasking a unit to fill a certain number of Marines of certain ranks and military 
occupational specialties to serve as advisors without regard for suitability to serve as an 
advisor. 
The pre-deployment training of Marines assigned to advisor missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan varied widely. There are accounts of teams having only a few weeks of pre-
deployment training at organizations such as Security, Cooperation, Education, and 
Training Center (SCETC) and the Advisor Training Cells (ATCs) resident with the 
Marine Expeditionary Forces.29 Many of these accounts were in the early years of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the mission expanded and progressed, the pre-
deployment training became more formalized and extensive through organizations such 
as the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) and the Advisor Training 
                                                 
27 James H. Willbanks, “The Evolution of the U.S. Advisory Effort in Viet Nam: Lessons Learned,” 
Journal of Conflict Studies 29 (2009). 
28 Rosenau et al., Marine Corps Advisors, 73. 
29 From the author’s personal experience as an advisor to the Iraqi Army in 2006. 
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Group (ATG) at Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms.30 In Iraq, Marine advisor teams 
attended the U.S. Army-run Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq.31 The Phoenix Academy 
provided further training on advisory and counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.32 Additionally, in 2011, the Marine Corps would stand up the Marine Corps 
Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG). MCSCG would replace ATG as the gatekeeper 
of institutional expertise on foreign advisor training, although foreign advising is just one 
aspect of their larger mission to support the security cooperation initiatives of the U.S. 
Marine Corps.33 One notable example of institutionalized pre-deployment advisor 
training came from the 3rd Marine Division during the early years in Afghanistan. 3rd 
Marine Division would become a “repository of knowledge on advising and operations in 
eastern Afghanistan.”34 The resident knowledge within 3rd Marine Division would 
become an important element of pre-deployment training and smooth transition between 
its advisors in Afghanistan.35 
To explain the deficit between what the U.S. military was tasked to accomplish 
and what they were able to actually accomplish in building the capability and capacity of 
Iraqi and Afghan security forces, there must be a study of techniques and practices of 
effective military advisors. As part of this thesis, an important area of research is what 
makes an effective advisor and advisor team. The literature in this area has included 
studies in military advising missions throughout Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia. Although there are vast differences in cultures, values, and political and 
military conditions, there are common skills and techniques of effective military advisors. 
The first and most critical requirement of the effective military advisor is a thorough 
understanding of the language and culture of their counterparts.36 The thorough 
                                                 
30 Rosenau et al., Marine Corps Advisors, 47. 
31 From the author’s personal experience as an advisor to the Iraqi Army in 2006. 
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 11
understanding of language and culture will provide the advisor with context for which he 
can adapt training and advisory techniques to suit the local conditions. A second 
requirement of the effective military advisor is the ability to “adapt U.S. organizational 
concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions.”37 A third key requirement 
is the ability of the advisor to establish rapport, increasing the likelihood that their 
“counterpart will accept and act on his advice.”38 Although linked to the language and 
culture training of the advisor, the advisor must be able to understand, and work within, 
the values, attitudes, and behavioral patterns of their foreign counterparts.39 The final 
aspect of effective military advisors is their individual personal and professional traits 
such as military proficiency, patience, persistence, personal conduct, professionalism, and 
willingness to accept hardship.40 A key element common among all literature on military 
advisors is that a good Marine is not necessarily a good advisor. Particular skills and 
personality traits are required to be effective as a military advisor and should be screened 
for during the selection process. 
In addition to the selection, training, and deploying of effective advisors and 
advisor teams, the doctrine of advising and foreign security force assistance was a key 
element of the U.S. and coalition force’s mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. The doctrine of 
advising and foreign security force assistance reflects the importance of political, as well 
as military, development. Joint Publication 3–22: Foreign Internal Defense states that 
“the construct of an Internal Defense and Development program should integrate security 
force and civilian actions into a comprehensive effort.”41 
The literature on the war in Afghanistan since 2001, particularly the building and 
sustainment of the Afghanistan National Army, has focused on the challenges the army 
faces based largely on the challenges from the society from which it is drawn. These 
challenges include legitimacy of governance; traditional relationship between local, 
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tribal, and central governments; and pervasive corruption. A major problem within 
Afghanistan that has resulted from the U.S. invasion and subsequent nation-building 
efforts has focused on the issue of legitimacy of governance. The U.S. and coalition 
forces sought to establish a legitimate government based on elections; however, a 
legitimate central government based on elections eliminated or marginalized the only two 
culturally acceptable sources of legitimacy in Afghanistan: traditional or religious.42 The 
second major issue throughout the literature in Afghanistan is the relationship between 
the local, tribal, and central governments. The composition and functions of the 
government in Afghanistan requires a balance achieved between the top-down power of 
the central government and the bottom-up power of the local tribal and jirga leadership. 
Leadership and governance at the local level have been viewed by the Afghan people as 
not only legitimate but just.43 A final major topic throughout the literature on 
Afghanistan is the pervasiveness of corruption by the patron-client structure in the 
Afghan government and society. Corruption is so pervasive because the leadership of 
Afghanistan has been unable to overcome their disposition for infighting and placing 
personal desires above national unity and stability.44 
The literature on the war in Iraq and the subsequent nation-building efforts since 
2003 has primarily focused on the ethno-sectarian conflict among its Shi’a, Sunni, and 
Kurdish communities. The intercommunal conflict in Iraq was largely due to long-held 
animosities between them that were exacerbated by U.S. government’s disbandment of 
the old Iraqi Army and the removal of the Sunni ruling elite through be-Ba’athification 
laws.45 Much of the literature on the war in Iraq and the development of the Iraqi Army 
stressed that: “Success of Iraqi force development depends at least as much on Iraqi 
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political progress as on the strength and quality of Iraqi forces.”46 A final major 
characterization of the attempt to build the Iraqi Army throughout much of the literature 
is the division of loyalties to family, tribe, or religious sect over that of loyalty to the Iraqi 
central government. This division of loyalties was highlighted by the collapse of the Iraqi 
Army Second Division at Mosul in the face of numerically-inferior and far less equipped 
fighters of the Islamic State. The Iraqi Army Second Division, made up predominately of 
Sunni and Kurdish soldiers, ultimately opted to defend their families and their territories 
rather than battle the Islamic State under the command of the Iraqi central government.47 
In the study of the re-building of the Iraqi and Afghan national armies, it was 
important to study the construction of national militaries in contentious ethnic and 
conflict-ridden societies. The challenge of building a military in a contentious ethnic and 
conflict-ridden society often results in a military divided along sectarian lines threatens 
national unity and reconciliation.48 
The final major area of literature to help understand the failures of the Iraqi and 
Afghan national armies is the U.S. military’s doctrine on counterinsurgencies and foreign 
security force assistance. An analysis of the efforts to rebuild the Iraqi and Afghan armies 
must be looked at through the lens of past insurgencies. A review of the historical 
principles of counterinsurgencies is important to evaluate the U.S. efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Among the most relevant to the construction of national armies loyal to the 
central government capable of defending their territories from internal and external 
threats are: “legitimacy is the main objective,” “political factors are primary,” “security 
under the rule of law is essential,” and “prepare for a long-term commitment.”49 
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Further examination is needed to explain the failures of the Iraqi and Afghan 
national armies and their ability to defend their territories from internal and external 
threats. Are their failures due to the shortfalls in doctrine and employment of the military 
advisor team or is it due to the internal domestic situation within those countries and a 
failure of the U.S. government and military to develop a strategy without a thorough 
understanding of the historical context, cultural landscape, resources, capabilities, and 
limitations of Iraq and Afghanistan? 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a comparative case study approach, comparing the U.S. military’s 
missions of building the Iraqi and Afghan national armies to examine the similarities 
between two armies that despite significant time and resources have largely been unable 
to defend their territories from internal and external threats. The case studies of Iraq and 
Afghanistan were chosen because of their many similarities and based on the author’s 
personal experience as a military advisor in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, they present two versions of a similar problem. In both cases, the U.S. 
military was tasked to rebuild a military from scratch following the collapse of the 
previous regime in the midst of an insurgency and both occurring at approximately the 
same time. 
This thesis will use a variety of sources to scholarly journals, policy papers, U.S. 
government documents including Congressional Research Service reports, and reports 
from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and Special Inspector 
General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In addition, this thesis will use U.S. 
military doctrinal publications to more fully understand the U.S. military and 
government’s role and approach to foreign security force assistance and 
counterinsurgencies. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into six chapters using the case study and comparative 
analysis format. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II explains why the 
shortfalls of the military advisor and the conduct of the military advisory mission are 
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insufficient to explain the failures of the Iraqi and Afghan national armies. Chapter III is 
an analysis of the case study of Afghanistan and the U.S. military efforts to construct the 
Afghanistan National Army. Chapter IV provides a case study of Iraq and the U.S. 
military efforts to construct the Iraqi Army. Chapter V is a comparative analysis between 
the case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapter VI is the conclusion and outlines 
implications for future conflicts. 
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II. SHORTFALLS OF THE MILITARY ADVISOR ARE 
INSUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN THE FAILURES OF THE IRAQI 
AND AFGHAN ARMIES 
Anthony Cordesman from the Center for International and Security Studies in 
Iraqi Force Development wrote, “The most important developments in making Iraqi 
forces effective has nothing to do with the forces themselves or with the nature of the 
U.S. support or advisory effort. Rather, they are about the ability to create levels of 
political compromise and conciliation that deprive the insurgency and Iraq’s civil 
conflicts of their popular base.”50 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain why, despite $60 billion and more than a 
decade of military advisory efforts, the Iraqi and Afghan national armies are not unified, 
sustainable forces loyal to the central government and capable of defending their 
territories from internal and external threats. The first hypothesis is that the failures of the 
Iraqi and Afghan armies are a result of insufficient doctrine and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to select, train, organize, deploy, and employ combat advisors to partnered 
foreign security forces. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the performance of the armies with 
embedded advisors and coalition enabler support were superior to those without. The 
superior performance of the Iraqi and Afghan armies with embedded advisors and 
coalition enabler support provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the failures of 
their armies were not attributed to shortfalls in doctrine and TTPs of the military advisory 
effort. This section will provide evidence against the hypothesis by a review of the 
capabilities and performance assessments of the Iraqi and Afghan armies with advisors 
and coalition support measured against those without. 
The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) with embedded advisors and coalition 
support enablers such as close air support, fire support, medical evacuation, logistics, and 
intelligence achieved higher levels of capabilities and performance than those without. In 
2014, all military advisors were pulled out of ANA units and remained only at the most 
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senior levels of the ANA and Ministry of Defense (MoD).51 In his testimony before the 
U.S. Congress, John F. Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction, stated that “without the strong monitoring and mentoring arm of U.S. and 
coalition troops to help, it is increasingly unlikely they will develop into a robust and 
sustainable force. SIGAR has found that the capability of Afghan National Defense 
Security Forces (ANDSF) units regressed when deprived of U.S. or Coalition 
assistance.”52 The regression of ANA capability when left without advisors and coalition 
enabler support has been echoed in SIGAR Quarterly Reports since 2010. SIGAR 
reporting stated that once units were deemed capable of independent operations, there 
was “significant levels of backsliding in their capability levels.”53 SIGAR attributed this 
backsliding to the withdrawal of advisors and coalition enabler support once ANA units 
were assessed as being able to operate independently by the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF).54 In “The Afghan National Army After ISAF,” Antonio 
Guistozzi and Ali Mohammad Ali wrote that the ANA will show significant decay in 
their capabilities once the ANA no longer had embedded advisors. Guistozzi and Ali 
wrote that eight out of nine ANA officers had positive views and enjoyed the support and 
advice given to them by advisors and that the presence of advisors was a psychological 
boost because of the advice and enabler support they were able to provide.55 ANA 
officers also had positive views of their advisors because they were able to limit 
corruption within the ANA and were able to inform Kabul through the ISAF chain of 
command of the problems within the ANA.56 In January 2014, the Center for Naval 
Analysis (CNA) published the “Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security 
Forces.” This assessment concluded that “international enabler support—to include 
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advisors—will be essential to ANSF success through at least 2018” and that “if the U.S. 
and NATO do not maintain a training and advisory mission in Afghanistan, the absence 
of advisors in 2015 is likely to result in a downward spiral of ANSF capabilities—along 
with security in Afghanistan.”57 The importance of advisors and enabler support to the 
success of the ANA were demonstrated during recent operations in Kunduz. During 
operations in Kunduz, U.S.-provided close air support and Special Operations Forces 
advisors were vital in support of the Afghan National Security Forces’ efforts to retake 
the city from the Taliban.58 In Afghanistan, the evidence supports that the ANA achieved 
higher levels of capability and performance with advisors and enabler support. The decay 
of capabilities of the ANA when uncovered from advisor and coalition enabler support 
supports the hypothesis that the failures of the ANA is not due to shortfalls of the military 
advisor, doctrine, and TTPs of the advisor mission. 
As with Afghanistan, the Iraqi Army achieved higher levels of capability and 
performance when partnered with advisors and received U.S. and coalition enabler 
support. As reported by the Congressional Research Service in “Iraqi Politics and 
Governance,” at the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, the 350,000-strong Iraqi Army 
was assessed as a “relatively well-trained and disciplined force” and “relatively well 
armed, utilizing heavy armor supplied by the United States.”59 In the October 2011 
Report to Congress, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction would report 
that U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) would declare that the ISF is “the fastest-growing military, 
with the highest [operations tempo] in the world in the last eight years” and “the most 
capable counterinsurgency force in the Middle East and Central Asia.”60 At the time of 
the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, the number of security incidents and casualties 
sustained had “decreased since the ISF took the lead in security operations after the 
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signing of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement,” continuing the decline since the U.S. surge 
and Sunni Awakening, or sahwa, in 2007–2008.61 
With U.S. advisor support through 2011, the Iraqi Army would perform 
reasonably well and was capable of providing security across Iraq. The successful 
offensive in Basra against the Shi’a militias in 2008 would demonstrate that the Iraqi 
Army, with U.S. advisors and support, was capable of conducting military operations 
under the direction of the Iraqi central government. It was noted that during the Basra 
operation, the Iraqi Army units with U.S. advisors performed better than those without 
U.S. advisors.62 Stephen Biddle in “How to Leave a Stable Iraq” wrote: the First and 26th 
Brigades, “deployed with Marine advisors, performed well, whereas the brigades without 
U.S. advisors and partners did poorly, with one effectively collapsing in combat.” Biddle 
would further conclude that the Basra campaign “would have ended in disaster if not for 
support from coalition firepower and the arrival of ISF with U.S. military and police 
training teams.”63 The loss of U.S. advisors and coalition enabler support would uncover 
problems within the Iraqi Army. According to Anthony Cordesman in “Shaping the Iraqi 
Security Forces,” the departure of U.S. advisors led to growing levels of politicization 
and corruption from the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi 
government leading to a division of loyalties and fractionalization along ethno-sectarian 
lines that significantly degraded the capabilities of the Iraqi Army as a unified national 
army loyal to the central government.64 The Islamic State offensive in the summer of 
2011 that seized significant territories of northern and western Iraq, including Mosul, 
Iraq’s second largest city, demonstrated that the Iraqi Army was unable to defend its 
territories from internal and external threats. How did the well-trained and well-equipped 
350,000 strong Iraqi Army, assessed as the “most capable counterinsurgency force in the 
Middle East” at the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, fail to prevent the advance of 
the Islamic State? 
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The performance of the Iraqi and Afghan armies with advisors and coalition 
enabler support has been assessed as capable to operate independently to provide security 
within their territories. When advisor and enabler support has been withdrawn, both 
armies have experienced major setbacks in the face of the Islamic State and the Taliban. 
The performance of the both the Iraqi and Afghan armies with advisors measured against 
their performance once the advisors have been withdrawn provides evidence against the 
hypothesis that the failures of their armies were not likely due to shortfalls in doctrine 
and TTPs of the military advisory effort, but larger, more comprehensive problems of 
governance and societies from which the Iraqi and Afghan armies are drawn. 
  
 22
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 23
III. MISSION TO REBUILD THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY 
At least 65 Afghan soldiers have defected to the Taliban, taking their 
weapons and equipment with them and 88 have been killed in days of 
heavy fighting in the volatile southern province of Helmand, the local 
provincial Governor said on Saturday…Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf 
Ahmadi said in a statement that five commanders and 65 army soldiers 
“repented their mistakes and surrendered to Mujahideen,” bringing five 
armored personnel carriers as well as weapons and ammunition. 
 —James Mckenzie65 
The preceding quote was taken from a November 2015 Reuters’ article titled 
“Dozens of Afghan troops defect to Taliban in Helmand Fighting.” Less than two weeks 
prior and following the temporary fall of Kunduz to the Taliban, Reuters also reported 
“Taliban threatens southern Afghan city, civilians flee.”66 The Afghan city is Lashkar 
Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand Province. Though the ANA has appeared to be 
offering stiffer resistance than that of the Iraqi Army, these reports conjure comparison to 
the collapse of the Iraqi Army and the fall of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul to the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in June 2014. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why, despite an immense military 
advisory effort over more than thirteen years and $38 billion spent on the Afghanistan 
National Army, the ANA is not a sustainable force loyal to the central government and 
capable of defending Afghanistan from internal and external threats. There have been 
reams of academic work dedicated to the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the 
military advisor to train and mentor indigenous forces in the establishment and 
sustainment of a central army. The selection, training, organization, and deployment of 
combat advisors by the U.S. military has faced numerous challenges during the recent 
advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; including poor quality of indigenous recruits, 
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inadequate advisor screening and selection, inadequate pre-deployment training, language 
and cultural barriers, and command and control issues.67 These shortfalls are, however, 
insufficient to explain why the ANA are losing ground to a resurgent Taliban and a 
growing threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant–Khorasan. There are four 
key premises as to why the ANA has not met the expectations of a sustainable and 
legitimate central army: failure to achieve legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation 
and will to fight, creation of an army in the western image rather than an army that meets 
the needs of Afghanistan, and the lack of a long-term U.S. strategy and commitment. 
These four premises are not novel concepts new to the U.S. military’s institutional 
knowledge base, but bedrock principles are laid out in the U.S. Army’s 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan over the past 14 
years demonstrates a disregard for the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine: 
“legitimacy is the main objective,” do not attempt to “build and train host-nation security 
forces in the U.S. military’s image,” “security under the rule of law is essential,” and 
“counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.”68 
Following the attacks on 9/11, U.S.-led forces would ally with the Northern 
Alliance, comprised of ethnic minority Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, to overthrow the 
Taliban government in Kabul.69 The Taliban government, led by Mullah Omar, the 
“commander of the faithful,” was targeted because of their granting sanctuary to al-
Qaeda and refusing to give up Osama bin Laden.70 Left with virtually no government in 
Afghanistan, the U.S.-sanctioned Bonn Conference was held to “lay the groundwork for 
Afghanistan’s future political processes and institutions of governance.”71 The Bonn 
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Accords would establish provisions for the reorganization of Afghan military forces and 
be the genesis for the U.S. military’s role in rebuilding the Afghanistan National Army.72 
“The real military strength of Afghanistan depends on the armed population rather 
than on the regular forces.”73 This passage dates from the British experience during the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 and underlies the idea that the Afghans were very poor 
at raising, deploying, and sustaining a regular army on a conventional battlefield.74 The 
real source of military strength of Afghanistan was the raising of militias through the 
mobilization of local communities and tribes.75 Since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Germany, France, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States have provided material support to raising and sustaining a central army in 
Afghanistan. Despite tremendous resources and efforts provided by both the central 
government of Afghanistan and outside actors, Afghanistan has been unable to establish 
and sustain a durable central army under the control of the country’s political leadership. 
A. CURRENT SITUATION 
The current situation in Afghanistan has the Afghanistan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) responsible for security throughout the country. U.S. and NATO forces have 
shifted their focus to the train, advise, and assist mission as covered under Operation 
Resolute Support.76 Throughout 2015, the Taliban and ISIL-K have increased their 
operational tempo throughout Afghanistan including major offensives in Baghlan, 
Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, and Helmand provinces.77 As of September 2015, 30 
districts centers have either fallen or are in danger of falling to the Taliban or ISIL-K.78 
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Recent major setbacks for the Afghan government include the temporary capture of 
Kunduz, Afghanistan’s fifth largest city and the provincial capital, by the Taliban. The 
Taliban controlled Kunduz for almost two weeks before the Afghan Security Forces were 
able to regain control with significant support from U.S. Special Operations Forces and 
U.S.-provided close air support.79 Afghan Security Forces have also been continuously 
engaged with Taliban forces for the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and the districts of 
Marjah, Musa Qalah, and Nad Ali in Helmand Province.80 The United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) stated that “the intensity of conflict in 
Afghanistan shows no signs of abating and the security environment has become more 
fragile and dynamic.”81 
The status of the ANA also presents a tenuous situation due to understrength of 
approved total forces, continued high attrition rates, and the absence of a Defense 
Minister for more than a year. As of July 2015, there are 160,461 soldiers assigned to the 
ANA (including the Afghanistan Air Force) out of the 195,000 approved end goal 
strength.82 This leaves a deficit of 34,539 soldiers needed to fill the ranks of the ANA. 
According to the latest Quarterly Report from the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction, the monthly attrition rate was 2.4% (3,851 soldiers), 
including combat casualties, discharges, and desertions.83 According to a SIGAR 
Quarterly Report from December 2014, of the 149,185 soldiers, 30,000 were assigned to 
staffs and headquarters, leaving only 119,485 soldiers assigned to combat units.84 Of 
those soldiers assigned to combat units, only 75,258 were actually present for duty.85 The 
numbers of soldiers in the ANA has been a matter of dispute as recognized by a statement 
from the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CTSC-A) that “there is 
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no viable method of validating their personnel numbers.”86 The numbers of ANA soldiers 
present for duty is widely skewed by inaccurate personnel reporting by commanders that 
report inflated numbers to receive additional pay and rations used to augment their 
salaries; a practice referred to as “ghost soldiers.”87 The challenges of accurate reporting 
and personnel management are indicative of a force that lacks the leadership and 
organizational skills to manage their soldiers and resources. To compound the problem of 
leadership within the Afghanistan National Security Forces, political squabbling in the 
Parliament has failed to approve President Ghani’s three nominations for Defense 
Minister, leaving the country without for more than a year.88 
The ANSF are supported by a coalition of 40 countries contributing 12,905 troops 
as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission as of December 2015.89 The U.S. 
contributes the majority of forces with 6,800 troops.90 After 2015, that number will fall to 
5,500 U.S. troops through 2016 where the number of troops required will be re-
evaluated.91 In December 2015, NATO pledged to continue support to the Afghanistan 
national defense and security forces with $4.1 billion per year through 2020 and a 
commitment of 12,000 NATO troops through 2016.92 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL ARMY 
Antonio Giustozzi, in The Army of Afghanistan, states that the establishment of a 
central army is a “key process to state formation.”93 This central army must be under the 
direct control of the political leadership as a key tool in wielding the power of the state 
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and around this central army the state begins to emerge.94 Geography, culture, and ethnic 
and tribal frictions play important roles in the power of the central government and 
establishment of a national army. The history of Afghanistan is characterized by a 
balance of power between the central government, the mullahs, and the tribal elders 
(jirga). In “Refighting the Last War,” Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason wrote that the 
balance of power was with the jirga and when the central government tried to extend its 
reach, “violent, conservative rural revolution led by the mullahs and framed in terms of 
jihad brought down the government.”95 This was revealed during the reign of King 
Amanullah in the 1920s, the communists in the 1970s, and potentially with the current 
central government by the Taliban or ISIL-K.96 
Antonio Giustozzi, in The Army of Afghanistan, wrote that “the need to create a 
more effective army was one of the driving factors in the modernization of Afghan 
society.”97 The need to create a better trained and equipped central army dates back to the 
1800s when Afghanistan’s neighbors in the Middle East and Central Asia outclassed its 
traditional feudal cavalry.98 Many attempts were made by the Afghan monarchs 
throughout the 1800s and the first half of the 20th century to create a more effective, 
modern, European-style army, but for a number of reasons, Afghanistan would never be 
able to raise and sustain a durable central army. The historical challenges of the creation 
and sustainment of an Afghan central army were largely reflected from the society from 
the army is drawn. The first major challenge was the lack of funding through an 
ineffective and inefficient taxation system to support the modernization and sustainment 
of a modern central army. The second major challenge is an education system that was 
insufficient to support the training and technical skills required of military occupations 
such as engineering, artillery, aviation, and an educated officer corps. A third major 
challenge was the internal strife and division among the ethnicities and tribes in 
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Afghanistan. A fourth major challenge was the patronage system of military officer 
appointees that resulted in incompetent and often illiterate officers.99 A fifth major 
challenge was the fascination and over-reliance on military technology at the expense of 
professional skills such as administration, education, and logistics.100 A final challenge to 
the creation and sustainment of a strong central army was that the government designed 
an army to deal with internal disturbances. Abdur Rahman, the Iron Emir, was said to 
have “relied on the old practice of mobilizing local communities for waging internal 
wars, rather than on the regular army.”101 Giustozzi labeled this the feudal model in 
which the regime would form “irregular forces under the control of rural elites, loosely 
connected to the ruling group.”102 
The size of the Afghanistan central army would vary widely in size throughout 
the 20th century. At its smallest, the army under Habibullah II in the 1920s would consist 
of only 24,000 soldiers because the central government lacked the resources to raise and 
sustain a large central army.103 At its largest (except for the modern Afghanistan National 
Army), the army under Mohammad Najibullah in the 1980s would consist of 160,000 
soldiers and was attributed to the patronage of the Soviet Union during the Soviet-Afghan 
War.104 
The collapse of the Najibullah regime at the hands of the mujahedeen in 1992 
through the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Afghan National Army would 
dissolve into units loyal to local strongmen. Guistozzi in The Army of Afghanistan wrote: 
“The armed forces were essentially an irregular militia under the orders of charismatic 
warrior mullahs…staffed by professionals left over from the Soviet period.”105 During 
the Taliban regime, Mullah Omar would wield direct control over these commanders who 
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conducted their own recruitment in terms of how many and what type of men to 
recruit.106 The Taliban did recruit specialists from the former Afghan National Army 
including tank crews, artillerymen, pilots, and communications specialists to operate and 
to train in the handling of sophisticated military equipment.107 Despite low levels of 
training and military technology, the armed forces under the Taliban regime, through 
superior intelligence and shared ideology, were largely able to exert control over most of 
Afghanistan.108 
C. PREMISE ONE: POLITICAL FAILURE TO ACHIEVE LEGITIMACY 
OF GOVERNANCE 
“Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy 
and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.”109 The preceding passage 
from the Counterinsurgency Field Manual underscores the idea that the government’s 
legitimacy is paramount in achieving victory over the insurgency. The central goal of the 
counterinsurgent is to establish the government as legitimate in the eyes of the people and 
to be capable of providing basic essential services, security, and stability under the rule of 
law. Anthony Cordesman in “Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan 
Security Forces,” wrote that the lines of operation for the governance of Afghanistan 
must include the rule of law, capacity development and public service delivery, 
parliamentary strengthening, government accountability, and democracy and human 
rights.110 The ANA, as an extension of the central government of Afghanistan in its 
efforts for security and stability, must be viewed as legitimate by both the people of 
Afghanistan and the soldiers within the ANA. If the Afghan central government lacks 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people, the ANA will not be viewed as a legitimate 
protector and source of stability and security. 
                                                 
106 Ibid., 117. 
107 Giustozzi, Army of Afghanistan, 117. 
108 Ibid., 121. 
109 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 3. 
110 Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, and David Kasten, Winning in Afghanistan: Creating 
Effective Afghan Security Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 
49. 
 31
The sources of legitimacy of the government in Afghanistan play a critically 
important role in whether the people of Afghanistan view the government and its entities 
as legitimate to rule over the country. The father of modern sociology, Karl “Max” 
Weber, published his studies on the legitimacy of governance in his book Politik als 
Beruf.111 Weber identified three sources of government legitimacy: traditional (dynastic 
and hereditary leadership such as monarchies and patrimonial systems), charismatic 
(religious authority), and rational-legal (institutional procedures and representative 
governments).112 The history of Afghanistan demonstrates that legitimate government is 
derived only from traditional and charismatic sources.113 The legitimacy from traditional 
sources in Afghanistan is derived from and represented by the monarchy and the 
patriarchal structure of the tribal system. The legitimacy from charismatic sources in 
Afghanistan is characterized by the religious structure and leadership of the mullahs. An 
example of this source of legitimacy was when the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, donned 
the Cloak of the Prophet in 1996 and declared himself the Amir ul-Mumaneen, or leader 
of the faithful.114 
In Afghanistan, the U.S. sought to impose legitimacy though Weber’s rational-
legal model with the establishment of a Western-style electoral democracy and consent of 
the governed.115 With the imposition of a rational-legal model of legitimacy, the United 
States eliminated or marginalized the only two culturally acceptable sources of 
legitimacy: traditional and religious.116 The U.S. heavily influenced the 2002 loya jirga 
(grand council) which appointed Hamid Karzai as the Interim President.117 He would 
remain as the President through nationwide elections in 2004 and 2009. The loya jirga is 
a forum comprised of hundreds of Afghan tribal leaders, politicians, and religious clerics 
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that would gather to make decisions based on consensus.118 The U.S. sought to impose a 
western-style electoral process that had no historical basis for the establishment of a 
legitimate central government. Peter Tomsen, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Afghan 
Resistance from 1989–1992, wrote in The Wars of Afghanistan that Karzai’s selection as 
the interim President cast him as a foreign puppet and the result of a foreign power 
putting its surrogate on the Afghan throne.119 The U.S. and its NATO allies viewed the 
election of Hamid Karzai to the presidency as a great success, but the Afghan people 
viewed the “Karzai government as illegitimate because it was elected.”120 
The composition and functions of the government in Afghanistan requires a 
balance achieved between the top-down power of the central government and the bottom-
up power of the local tribal and jirga leadership. The strength of Afghan society and 
governance has traditionally been held at the local level by the tribe via the jirga. 
Afghans have viewed the central government as susceptible to losing its autonomy 
through the pressures and influences of foreign elements such as Pakistan, the Russia, 
and the United States. Leadership and governance at the local level have been viewed by 
the Afghan people as not only legitimate but just. In “The Political Economy of the 
Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan,” Jennifer Brick found that 
according to recent surveys, “78 percent believe their community leaders are fair and 
honest. 78 percent of those interviewed said that their informal customary local councils 
(shuras and jirgas) are effective at delivering justice and representing their interests.”121 
The strength of the elements of power at the local level was far underestimated by the 
U.S. and its attempts to create a strong central government with the ability to extend its 
reach across the countryside. The strength of the leadership at the local level was also 
highlighted by Jeffery Roberts in The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan when he wrote, 
“while Afghans have always refused to accept foreign rule, rarely have they proved 
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amenable to a strong central government.”122 Further amplifying the relationship between 
the central and local governments, Peter Tomsen stated that key to stabilizing the country 
is for the central government to extend gradually its influence to the provinces through a 
cooperative relationship with the autonomous tribal and religious forces.123 
The final aspect of the failure at achieving legitimacy of governance is the 
pervasiveness of corruption by the patron-client structure in the Afghan government and 
society. The corruption within the government of Afghanistan is addressed in nearly 
every academic study of the country. Peter Tomsen wrote that corruption is pervasive 
because the leadership of Afghanistan has been unable to overcome their disposition for 
infighting and placing personal desires above national unity and stability.124 According to 
the Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of corruption in 180 
countries, Afghanistan ranked next nearly last at 179th.125 In Giustozzi’s Army of 
Afghanistan, he wrote that “the problem with client states such as Afghanistan is that they 
tend to be weak and ineffective. The aim to build an effective state is at odds with that of 
maintaining patron-client relations with it, as the latter compromises one of the key 
features of a state that is its legitimacy.”126 The main problem with the patron-client 
system in Afghanistan is that power and influence were given through patronage to 
elements within Afghan society that had no claim to it based on the traditional or 
religious sources of legitimacy. In Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, Giustozzi wrote that 
a connection to Karzai or the U.S. government enabled local strongmen, notables, and 
militia commanders to achieve positions of power and influence within various levels of 
the Afghan central and provincial government including the Ministries of Interior and 
Defense.127 
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D. PREMISE TWO: LACK OF MOTIVATION AND WILL TO FIGHT 
Most of the ANA are not willing to fight and die for the central government of 
Afghanistan perceived as corrupt and illegitimate by the individual soldier. The Taliban, 
however, are willing to fight and to die waging jihad in the name of Islam. Giustozzi 
describes the sentiments of an Afghan village elder, “the Taliban are united and have 
faith in their goals, and they do not fight for money.”128 In Chris Mason’s Strategic 
Lessons Unlearned, he quotes Afghan war veteran and military analyst John Cook: “the 
Taliban, lacking any formal military training, poorly led and poorly equipped, often 
living in caves, enduring incredible hardships shows far more fight and aggressiveness on 
the battlefield than the Afghan army…the Taliban army believe in their cause enough to 
die for it, while the Afghan soldiers do not.”129 In a recent article in Small Wars Journal, 
Lamar Fahad compares the effectiveness of two examples of Afghan armies: the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) under the Najibullah regime and the current 
ANA. The DRA Army was molded with nationalistic ideologies to unite the army in the 
common purpose of fighting the foreign enemy.130 Comparing the success of the DRA 
Army at the battle of Jalalabad in 1989 with that of the failure of the ANA in Kunduz in 
October 2015, Fahad concluded that the national unity developed by Najibullah’s anti-
Pakistani and anti-Islamist rhetoric was critical to the development of an army motivated 
behind a common cause.131 This stood in stark contrast to the presidencies of Karzai and 
Ghani, who labeled the Taliban as political opponents and brothers, rather than as the 
enemy.132 The development of national unity behind a common purpose against a 
common enemy is critical to the development and sustainment of the motivation and will 
to fight of the ANA. 
In his comprehensive work on the army of Afghanistan, Giustozzi identified a 
number of reasons why the Afghan soldiers desert from the ANA: corruption among 
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officers, poor medical care and the neglect of the soldiers and families of the injured and 
killed, intimidation by insurgents, poor living conditions, lack of welfare system to 
support the ANA, service in remote locations far from the soldiers home, and the 
uncertainties of the impending departure of ISAF.133 As with other elements of the 
Afghan government, corruption is evident within the Afghan security structures and 
further harms the morale and motivation of the ANA. According to the recent 
“Afghanistan Report” by the Institute for the Study of War, the U.S. Congress 
commissioned an independent assessment of the ANSF and found “pervasive corruption 
within the Afghan security institutions. Once the Operation Resolute Support mission 
withdraws its oversight…in 2016, patronage networks and factionalism have the potential 
to disrupt security force cohesion in the face of a revitalized Afghan insurgency.”134 The 
challenges faced by the soldier in the ANA significantly contribute to the lack of 
motivation and will to fight and die for the central government of Afghanistan perceived 
as illegitimate. 
E. PREMISE THREE: AN ARMY IN OUR IMAGE, RATHER THAN AN 
ARMY SUITED FOR AFGHANISTAN 
“The Taliban don’t have D-30 howitzers, it doesn’t have [reconnaissance aircraft], 
it doesn’t have Mi-35s, Mi-17s, MD-530 helicopters. It doesn’t have up-armored 
Humvees. Yet the Taliban can still fight,” stated General John Campbell, commander of 
U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, in his testimony before the Senate on the status of the Afghan 
National Defense Security Forces.135 The efforts of the U.S. and NATO to build an 
effective central army included creating an army modeled after the U.S. military rather 
than an army suited for not only the security threats but on the capabilities and resources 
of Afghanistan. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual named “to build and train host-
nation security forces in the U.S. military’s image” in its list of unsuccessful 
counterinsurgent operational practices.136 The U.S. attempt to create an army without a 
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careful analysis of the capabilities and resources of the Afghan state has led to critical 
vulnerabilities of the ANA. The critical vulnerabilities that have resulted in the creation 
and sustainment of the ANA by U.S. and NATO forces are the budget and funding of the 
ANA, adequate numbers of sufficiently educated and skilled manpower to meet the needs 
of the ANA, and a logistics and equipment sustainability system to support the ANA 
nationwide. 
Afghanistan does not have the fiscal resources to sustain the ANA as designed 
and build by U.S. and NATO forces. The size and technical capabilities of the ANA do 
not match the fiscal resources at the disposal of the Afghan government. The ANA has an 
authorized end strength of 196,000 soldiers, almost 40,000 more soldiers than at its 
largest size under the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime in the 1980s.137 Recent reports 
have shown that it will require approximately $4 billion U.S. dollars annually to sustain 
the ANA at those troop levels.138 NATO has committed to support the Afghan security 
forces with the required $4.1 billion through 2020, but beyond 2020, Afghanistan’s 
ability to fund the ANA is uncertain.139 The FY 1394 (2015) budget for Afghanistan 
called for $7.6 billion; however, their tax revenue generated only $1.8 billion.140 The tax 
revenue of Afghanistan would support less than 50% of the required budget for the ANA. 
Building an army that exceeds the financial resources of Afghanistan jeopardizes the 
sustainability of the ANA as a force for security and stability. The funding provided by 
outside actors such as the U.S. and NATO further perpetuate the challenge of legitimacy 
faced by the Afghan central government because this financial support makes them 
dependent on foreign support to maintain its security forces. This challenge adds to the 
skeptical views of the Afghan people toward a central government seen as a foreign 
puppet. 
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Afghanistan has long dealt with the challenge of the quality and quantity of 
manpower available for service in the ANA. In The Army of Afghanistan, Giustozzi 
named the lack of an education system to produce reasonable levels of literacy would not 
support the training and technical skills required for the professionalization of the ANA 
in fields such as artillery, aviation, engineering, administration, and logistics.141 
Giustozzi points to the method for which the ANA was formed as a source of friction for 
the forming of a professional military in Afghanistan. The all-volunteer ANA did not 
attract quality recruits from across Afghan society. Many of the recruits represented a 
much lower level of education than the average Afghan only enlisting in the ANA 
because of lack of opportunities elsewhere.142 Giustozzi points out that the all-volunteer 
ANA did not allow for the recruitment of an army with professional skills important to 
the administration and logistics management of the force.143 The armies of Afghanistan 
had traditionally used conscription to form an army enabling it to gain soldiers that 
possessed high levels of education and professional skills. Unfortunately, neither the 
quantity nor quality of recruits available for service in the ANA would be able to be 
influenced by U.S. and NATO military advisors. The U.S.’s attempts to build a large, all-
volunteer central army in Afghanistan may be at odds with the realities of Afghan 
society. 
The ANA has had difficulty in creating and sustaining a logistical system that 
could support the needs of its units spread throughout the country. Technologically 
advanced systems such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), armored 
personnel carriers, and helicopters currently fielded to the ANA compounded the 
challenges faced by the Afghan logistics system. The after-action report from a U.S. 
Marine Corps advisor team assigned to the ANA 215th Corps in Helmand Province 
wrote, “the ANA struggle with maintaining the equipment they have and managing the 
supply chain from MoD to the Corps and out to the Kandak level. This is evidenced by 
the vehicle maintenance readiness Corps-wide, contracted weapons maintenance, and 
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minimal heavy equipment maintenance.”144 The ANA’s logistics system was based on 
the U.S. military’s model of “pull” logistics.145 The pull system relies on units requesting 
supplies and maintenance parts based on their varying needs of the mission and 
operational tempo. This system requires a significant level of “coordination and 
integration but…is more efficient and effective, delivering the right supplies to the right 
place at the right time.”146 The pull model of logistics is a very efficient model for the 
U.S. military because of a sophisticated logistical system managed by logistics 
professionals and utilized by commanders and staff that have the training and experience 
to foresee and plan for their logistical requirements alongside their operational 
requirements. Giustozzi noted that the highly centralized logistical system slowed the 
flow of supplies because “superior officers tended to be reluctant to release material.”147 
Despite significant mentoring and training by logistics advisors, the ANA has not 
developed and implemented a logistical system that can meet the needs of its highly 
dispersed forces. This trend of poor performance of the ANA’s logistical system can also 
be attributed to U.S. forces providing virtually all logistical support through the advisor 
teams. A report from the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) and ISAF 
regarding the logistical dependency of the ANA concluded: “As of summer 2013, NTM-
A and ISAF were still writing most contracts for the Afghan MoD, and transferring to 
them most resources, so that even if the new approach were successful, ANA logistics 
could not be ready for 2015…logistics are the Achilles’ heel.”148 The logistics system put 
in place by U.S. and NATO advisors to support the ANA was built on an image of the 
U.S. military logistics and supply system and did not account for the training, 
infrastructure, culture, and resources available to the ANA. No matter how proficient the 
ANA are at the tactical level against insurgent forces, the failure to establish an effective 
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and efficient logistics system remains a critical vulnerability of the ANA. This shortfall 
echoes the enduring military quip that “amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.” 
F. PREMISE FOUR: LACK OF LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGY AND 
COMMITMENT 
“Taliban leadership was doggedly pursuing a strategy of destabilization, neither 
the U.S. nor the Afghan government ever had a consistent strategy lasting more than a 
year,” wrote Antonio Giustozzi in Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.149 Hy Rothstein, in 
Afghan Endgames, would echo the lack of long-term strategy when he wrote: “The 
brilliant initial success that resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime and pushed al-
Qaeda into hiding was followed by eight years of inept policy and strategy.”150 The 
change of political and military leadership and domestic politics, both in the U.S. and in 
Afghanistan, brought changing strategies and varying levels of commitment over 14 
years of war. 
The changing strategy in Afghanistan over 14 years of war had a significant 
impact on the viability and legitimacy of the Afghan government and, in turn, the ANA. 
In an address to the nation on October of 2001, President Bush outlined the U.S. strategy 
as a counter-terrorist (CT) operation that included “carefully targeted actions…designed 
to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the 
military capability of the Taliban regime.”151 In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement, a 
UN-brokered and heavily U.S.-influenced deal, would lay the groundwork for 
arrangements to create permanent government institutions in Afghanistan.152 However, 
according to James Dobbins, a Bush Envoy at the Bonn Agreements, “the goal of 
‘democratic development’ was merely ‘an afterthought of the White House.’”153 The CT 
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operation, run predominately by U.S. and allied Special Operations Forces, lasted from 
2001 to 2004. Throughout these years, Afghanistan was viewed as an economy of force 
mission to that of Iraq. The mission in Afghanistan would receive just enough troops and 
resources to meet basic mission requirements as the main effort of the U.S. military was 
Iraq. Through 2008, the number of troops in Afghanistan would never exceed 30,100 
while nearly 160,000 troops would be deployed to Iraq.154 In 2008 and 2009, the mission 
in Afghanistan would incrementally grow from a CT operation that of nation-building. In 
an interview on PBS, General McKiernan, NATO and ISAF Commander, would echo the 
ideas of nation-building by stating, “Let’s not put it in military terms, because it’s going 
to take security, it’s going to take governance, and it’s going to take socioeconomic 
progress, all three of those in a comprehensive way.”155 In 2009, General McChrystal 
would be appointed as Commander, ISAF. In his Initial Assessment upon assuming 
command, he stated that a new strategy was needed; a new strategy that included an 
“integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the 
Afghan people.”156 Also in 2009, President Obama would surge 30,000 additional troops 
to support the COIN strategy and expanded mission. McChrystal’s COIN strategy would 
largely continue under the leadership of General Petraeus. Beginning in 2011 through 
present operations, President Obama would pursue what has been termed 
“Afghanization,” a play on President Nixon’s Vietnamization. The Afghanization 
strategy is an attempt, with domestic politics in mind, to turn over operations, security, 
and governance to the Afghans as soon as possible with the fewest casualties. Over 14 
years of war in Afghanistan, the strategy has suffered from incrementalism in its 
progression from CT to COIN to nation-building to Afghanization. Incrementalism and 
an ever-changing strategy have demonstrated that the Afghan government and ANA 
could rely on varying levels of commitment from U.S. political and military leadership. 
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The commitment of U.S. troops and resources are vital to the success of the ANA. 
For many years, the ANA and the Afghan government had heard the calls of the U.S. 
government for setting an end date to U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Setting 
an end date to U.S. military involvement provided the Afghan people no guarantee that 
promises made by the Afghan government will be upheld upon U.S. departure. The 
Afghan people fear that the security situation will further decline because the Afghan 
security forces lack the capability to maintain security and stability without significant 
support from U.S. and NATO forces. 
The commitment of U.S. resources was an important aspect of the ANA’s ability 
to conduct effective operations. Throughout the war in Afghanistan, the ANA had access 
to the range of military assistance from ISAF advisors that included logistics, command 
and control, intelligence, finance, air transport, and fire support, including extremely 
effective close air support (CAS). Many of these resources were unavailable to the ANA 
because of training and limited capabilities of the fledgling Afghan Ministry of Defense. 
The Afghans have significantly advanced in creating effective and sustainable solutions 
to challenges such as command and control, logistics, and intelligence support, but have 
been unable to develop an effective system for close air support due to a gap in trained 
personnel and available equipment. The “Afghanistan Report” from the Institute for the 
Study of War in March 2015, stated, “close air support is vital for Afghan security forces 
fighting the insurgency. It provides a significant tactical advantage…as security forces 
lose access to this capability, militants will be able to recover more quickly from counter 
operations and re-launch attacks in contested areas.”157 During recent operations in 
Kunduz, U.S.-provided close air support was vital in support of the ANDSF’s efforts to 
retake the city.158 The commitment of close air support to the ANA provides not only a 
tactical advantage but a significant advantage for the morale of the ANA. According to a 
recent assessment for Congress, the Afghan Air Force will not be operating near capacity 
until at least 2018.159 
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The establishment of the ANA brings with it a long-term commitment to support 
the training and operations for the ANA to be successful in providing security and 
stability in Afghanistan. The success of the ANA in providing a secure and stable 
Afghanistan is critical to supporting the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In Afghan 
Endgames, Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla would write about the importance of a long-
term commitment that “undermines our enemies’ belief that time is on their side.”160 The 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual echoes the need for a long-term commitment for a 
successful counterinsurgency: “The populace may prefer the HN government to the 
insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are 
convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to 
win…The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the 
counterinsurgents and the HN [host nation] government.”161 
G. CONCLUSION 
The United States and its NATO allies undertook an immense military advisory 
effort to rebuild the Afghanistan National Army following the fall of the Taliban regime 
in 2001. The literature that has resulted from the experience of the military advisor to the 
ANA has focused on tactics, techniques, and procedures for the training of indigenous 
forces. The shortfalls of the organization and operations of the military advisor and the 
advisor team are insufficient to explain why the ANA has not met the expectations of a 
sustainable and legitimate central army and are losing ground to a resurgent Taliban and 
an expanding ISIS. The four key premises that explain this deficit are the failure to 
achieve legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation and will to fight, the creation of an 
army in the western image rather than an army that meets the needs of Afghanistan, and 
the lack of a long-term U.S. strategy and commitment. The nation-building experience of 
U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan has underscored the importance of the 
foundational principles laid out in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. 
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The experience in Afghanistan has provided critical lessons to military and 
strategic planners engaging in military operations that require large-scale military 
advisory efforts as part of nation-building or counterinsurgency campaign. The first and 
most critical lesson is that there must be a thorough understanding of the historical 
context of the mission and strategy chosen to achieve the end state. The strategy chosen 
in Afghanistan sought to impose a Jeffersonian democracy centered on a strong central 
government did not respect the Afghan history and culture of local and tribal governance 
based on traditional and religious sources of legitimacy. The historical context of Afghan 
governance and its relation with society is highlighted by Thomas Johnson in 
“Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition.” Johnson wrote, “Past attempts at modern state 
formation in Afghanistan that have directly challenged the local tribal and religious 
structures of society have resulted in ethnic backlash and state failure.”162 A second 
critical lesson learned is despite significant time and resources invested; an outside force 
cannot build a strong central army capable of providing a secure and stable environment 
if the government is not viewed as legitimate and worth fighting and dying for. The third 
critical lesson learned is that the military advisory mission is an extremely important 
mission that advances the capacity and capability of partnered or allied nations, but 
military and strategic planners must understand the limitations of what can be achieved. 
The military advisor is capable of providing training and capabilities to partners and 
allies in support of the national strategy, but the military advisor cannot build an army 
from scratch if the government it serves is viewed as illegitimate by the soldiers and the 
populace nor can the advisor give it the motivation and will to fight. 
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IV. MISSION TO REBUILD THE IRAQI ARMY 
Iraqi army capitulates to ISIS militants in four cities. 
 —Martin Chuluv, Fazel Hawramy, and Spencer Ackerman163 
 
Iraqi soldiers, police drop weapons, flee posts in portions of Mosul. 
 —Chelsea J. Carter, Salma Abdelaziz, and Mohammed 
Tawfeeq164 
 
Jihadist group forces Iraqi military to retreat, takes control of pipeline 
land. 
 —Patrick Martin 165 
 
Iraqi army retreats from Tikrit after assault stalls. 
 —Raheem Salman and Maggie Fick 166 
 
In the summer of 2014, headlines depicting the collapse of the Iraqi Army in the 
face of the Islamic State offensive in northern Iraq dominated the national and 
international news. In 2014, the Islamic State167 launched major offensives in Nineveh, 
Salah Al Din, and Anbar Provinces, taking control of the major cities of Fallujah, Mosul, 
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and Tikrit.168 Nowhere else was the failure of the Iraqi Army more prominent than its 
performance in Mosul against fighters from the Islamic State. In Mosul, the Iraqi Army 
was reported to have approximately 30,000 soldiers organized into two divisions who 
retreated largely without firing a shot in the face of an estimated 800 Islamic State 
fighters.169 How could this happen? At the time of the U.S. military’s withdrawal from 
Iraq, the Iraqi Army was assessed as a “relatively well-trained and disciplined force” 
comprised of approximately 350,000 soldiers.170 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why, despite an immense military 
advisory effort over more than seven years and $20 billion spent,171 the Iraqi Army is not 
a sustainable force loyal to the central government and capable of defending Iraq from 
internal and external threats. There have been reams of academic work dedicated to the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures for the military advisor to train and mentor indigenous 
forces in the establishment and sustainment of a central army. The selection, training, 
organization, and deployment of combat advisors by the U.S. military has faced 
numerous challenges during the recent advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; 
including poor quality of indigenous recruits, inadequate advisor screening and selection, 
inadequate pre-deployment training, language and cultural barriers, and command and 
control issues.172 These shortfalls however, are insufficient to explain why the Iraqi 
Army failed against the Islamic State. There are four key premises as to why the Iraqi 
Army has not met the expectations of a sustainable and legitimate central army: failure to 
achieve legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation and will to fight, creation of an 
army in the western image rather than an army that meets the needs of Iraq, and the lack 
of a long-term U.S. strategy and commitment. 
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These four premises are not novel concepts new to the U.S. military’s institutional 
knowledge base but bedrock principles laid out in the U.S. Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual. The U.S. experience in Iraq demonstrates a disregard for the principles of COIN 
doctrine: “legitimacy is the main objective,” do not “build and train host-nation security 
forces in the U.S. military’s image,” “security under the rule of law is essential,” and 
“counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.”173 
In March 2003, a U.S.-led coalition force launched the invasion of Iraq which 
resulted in the spectacular defeat of Saddam Hussein’s military forces in 21 days. 
Following the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime, nearly all government and civil 
institutions disappeared overnight plunging the country into chaos and a sectarian civil 
war. The key elements of the U.S. strategy were democratization and the construction of 
a national army.174 As part of the implementation of this strategy, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority175 established CPA Order Number 1, the prohibition of members 
of the Ba’ath Party from serving in the new government, and CPA Order Number 2, the 
dissolution of the old Iraqi Army.176 The unintended consequences of the U.S. strategy 
and CPA Orders Number 1 and 2 would place the Shi’a majority (approximately 60% of 
the population) in the dominant political position within the new government and the new 
Iraqi Security Forces, while exacerbating the marginalization of the Sunnis.177 After four 
years of a grueling civil war marked by sectarian violence, a “surge” of coalition forces 
combined with the Sunni awakening, or sahwa,178 provided additional security to support 
the development the Iraqi Security Forces and a strengthened and inclusive Iraqi central 
government. Declining violence as a result of the surge and the sahwa, and the failure to 
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achieve a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to maintain U.S. forces in Iraq, would 
result in the departure of U.S. forces in December 2011.179 
To explain why the Iraqi Army has not met the expectations of a sustainable and 
legitimate central army despite an immense U.S. military advisory effort and $20 billion, 
this chapter will begin with an overview of the current situation in post-U.S. occupation 
Iraq followed by the historical context of the Iraqi Army within Iraqi society. Following 
the current situation and historical overview, this paper will examine four key premises 
for the failure of the Iraqi Army. 
A. CURRENT SITUATION— POST U.S. OCCUPATION 
Immediately following the U.S. military departure from Iraq in December 2011, 
Iraq would begin to experience a deterioration in both its security and political situation 
because of increasing domestic and sectarian strife and would ultimately result in the loss 
of significant territory to the Islamic State. Just days following the U.S. departure from 
Iraq and President Obama declaring Iraq a “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant country,” 
Iraqi Prime Minister, Nori al-Maliki, issued an arrest warrant for Tariq al-Hashimi, the 
Vice President and influential Sunni figure, for allegedly ordering assassinations, forcing 
him to flee to Turkey.180 In March 2012, the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) 
attempted to collect signatures to request a no-confidence vote against Maliki, but was 
unable to gain the number of signatures needed.181 In December 2012, following a stroke 
suffered by Iraqi President Jalal Talibani, Maliki moved against Finance Minister Rafi al-
Issawi, another influential Sunni, when he arrested 10 of his bodyguards forcing him to 
flee to the Sunni-dominated Anbar Province.182 
2013 would be marked by anti-Maliki demonstrations and growing sectarian 
conflict that would spread across Sunni areas in several provinces and within Sunni 
districts in Baghdad demanding reform or repeal of antiterrorism and de-Ba’athification 
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laws and improved government services.183 In early 2013, the ISF conducted attacks 
against Sunni demonstrations, including the killing of 40 civilians in the town of 
Hawijah, resulting in Sunni extremists stepping up attacks against the ISF.184 In an 
attempt to quell the violence, Maliki took steps toward reconciliation by transferring 
more authority to the provinces and the easing of de-Ba’athification laws.185 However, in 
late 2013, Maliki issued yet another arrest warrant for Sunni parliamentarian, Ahmad al-
Alwani, that ultimately ended in the ISF killing al-Alwani’s brother and a number of his 
bodyguards.186 Beginning in late 2013, the rising sectarianism would result in the ISF 
shutting down a protest camp in Ramadi (the capital of the predominately Sunni Anbar 
Province). In early 2014, fighters from the Islamic State, joined by Sunni protesters, ISF 
defectors, Sons of Iraq, and tribal fighters, captured the major Anbar Province cities of 
Ramadi and Fallujah.187 
The situation in Iraq in 2014 would be characterized by the rapid offensive of 
fighters from the Islamic State capturing significant territory in northern and western 
Iraq. By the fall of 2014, the Islamic State had seized the major cities of Mosul, Tikrit, 
Baiji, Sinjar, Ramadi, and Fallujah and had advanced as far as the outskirts of 
Baghdad.188 In the face of the advancing Islamic State, the Iraqi Army had all but 
disappeared. From 2014 through 2015, the Islamic State offensive would be halted by 
Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, Iranian-supported Shi’a militias, and coalition air strikes.189 
Since the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul in June 2014, the Iraqi government has 
relied heavily upon the sectarian militias to combat the Islamic State. By February 2016, 
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Iraqi forces, a mix of Shi’a and Sunni militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, Iraqi Army, and 
coalition air power, have succeeded in retaking Tikrit, Sinjar, Baiji, and Ramadi.190 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE IRAQI ARMY 
To understand the challenge presented to the U.S. military in the reconstruction of 
the Iraqi Army following its dissolution by CPA Order Number 2 in 2003, it is first 
important to understand the Iraqi Army in a historical context. The Iraqi Army was 
created by the British in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Arab Revolt during World War I.191 Jeremy Sharp from the Congressional Research 
Service wrote: “The Iraqi army has never been able to effectively integrate the country’s 
Arabs and Kurds, as the army has traditionally been a strong institution and a source of 
pride among many Iraqi Sunni and some Shiite Arabs.”192 Sunni Arab officers formed 
the core of the Iraqi Army, “which was primarily designed to be an internal security force 
with little or no ability to project power beyond Iraq’s border.”193 The Iraqi Army was 
designed to battle rebellious elements of society such as the Kurds in the north and Shi’a 
in the south.194 
When Iraq gained its independence in 1932, the Sunni officers became more 
politicized, which resulted in the 1958 military coup led by Major General Abdul-Karim 
Qassim to overthrow the monarchy.195 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Iraqi Army 
would experience tense relations between Sunni and Shi’a officers as a result of Kurdish 
revolts in northern Iraq and institutional discrimination within the army against the 
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Shi’a.196 These sectarian tensions would be exacerbated by the Sunni dominance of the 
officer corps at 70%, while Shi’a comprised 20%, and Kurds at 10%.197 
Under Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Army would be designed on the coup-proof 
model and be built around internal security forces and elite military units (Republican 
and Special Republican Guard units) to prevent regular army units from overthrowing the 
regime.198 Saddam’s efforts to build a coup-proof military would place trusted Sunni and 
Ba’athist loyalists in positions of power within the Iraqi Army structure. Saddam’s coup-
proofing model relegated Shi’a to low-level conscripts within the regular Iraqi Army that 
would bear the brunt of casualties in the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.199 
The U.S. military’s efforts to rebuild the new Iraqi Army following the toppling 
of the Saddam Hussein regime would turn the tables on the Sunni-Shi’a schism within the 
Iraqi Army. The dissolution of the old Iraqi Army and de-Ba’athification CPA Orders 
would have a dramatic impact and result in the new, predominately Shi’a, Iraqi Army.200 
The Iraqi government and the U.S.-led coalition endeavored to create a national army that 
integrated Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurds.201 An integrated Iraqi Army would be critical to bear 
the burden of counterinsurgency operations across the diverse sectarian landscape of Iraq. 
U.S. forces would not have the legitimacy as they were increasingly viewed as an 
occupying force by both Shi’a and Sunni populations. By the time U.S. forces withdrew 
from Iraq in December 2011, the 350,000-man Iraqi Army was viewed as a “relatively 
well-trained and disciplined force.”202 To highlight the sectarian schism within the Iraqi 
Army, Iraqi Prime Minister Hayder al-Abbadi in 2014, would not dispute claims that the 
Iraqi Army was 80% Shi’a Muslim and referred to by Sunnis as an “Iranian occupation 
force.”203 According to the Congressional Research Service, the Islamic State offensive 
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in the summer of 2014 would leave the Iraqi Army with “as few as 50,000 soldiers and 
very low morale.”204 
C. PREMISE ONE: POLITICAL FAILURE TO ACHIEVE LEGITIMACY 
OF GOVERNANCE 
“The most important developments in making Iraqi forces effective has nothing to 
do with the forces themselves or with the nature of the U.S. support or advisory effort. 
Rather, they are about the ability to create levels of political compromise and conciliation 
that deprive the insurgency and Iraq’s civil conflicts of their popular base,” wrote 
Anthony Cordesman in “Iraqi Force Development.”205 Cordesman describes the 
importance of political action by the Iraqi government to achieve legitimacy and 
conciliation across all segments of society. The central goal of the counterinsurgent is to 
establish the government as legitimate in the eyes of the people and to be capable of 
providing basic essential services, security, and stability under the rule of law. The U.S. 
Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual underscores the imperative of achieving political 
legitimacy within the list of historical principles for counterinsurgency: legitimacy is the 
main objective and political factors are primary.206 This section will address the issue of 
failure to achieve legitimacy of governance and its impact on the Iraqi Army by a study 
of the fractionalization of religious and ethnic segments of Iraq, corruption and 
politicization of the Iraqi Army under Prime Minister Nori al-Maliki, and reform efforts 
made by Prime Minister Hayder al-Abbadi. 
The fractionalization between religious and ethnic segments of Iraqi society had a 
significant impact on the formation and sustainability of the Iraqi Army following the 
U.S. invasion and toppling of the Saddam regime in 2003. In “Building an Integrated 
Military in Post-Conflict Societies,” Anne Marie Baylouny wrote: “Militaries are often 
viewed as crucial instruments of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Yet 
throughout much of the developing world…those militaries are crippled by 
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fractionalization.”207 The fractionalization of Iraqi society played a major role in the Iraqi 
government being viewed as illegitimate, particularly by the Sunni community. 
According to a 2014 study conducted by the social science research company, D3 
Systems, 66% of Sunni Arabs, 31% of Shi’a Arabs, and 39% of Kurds viewed the Iraqi 
government as illegitimate.208 The fractionalization of Iraqi society, particularly in the 
aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, would play an important role in the perceived 
illegitimacy of the Iraqi government and its effect on building a sustainable national 
army. 
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 would result in the spectacular defeat of the 
Iraqi military and the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. In the wake of the defeat, 
Iraq was instantly plunged into chaos as a result of the instantaneous deprivation of 
security and basic essential services that had been the responsibility of the Ba’athist 
regime. De-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the old Iraqi Army in May 2003 by 
Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority would amplify the loss of even the 
legitimate functions provided by Saddam’s Ba’athist regime such as basic policing, 
utilities, and public infrastructure. The predominately Sunni-led Iraqi Army and Ba’ath 
Party would be excluded from the post-Saddam political landscape and widen the 
division between the Sunni and Shi’a. The two key pillars of the U.S. strategy, 
democratization and formation of a national army, would make U.S. military and civilian 
leadership unknowingly complicit in furthering the divide between the Sunni and Shi’a. 
In pursuit of the strategy of democratization, the CPA would establish the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003 as an interim advisory body to lay the ground 
work for an elected, representative government but openly establish a quota system based 
on sect and ethnicity.209 In an attempt to create a representative government and at the 
urging of Shi’a and Kurdish leaders, the composition of the IGC was based on the 
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presumed ethno-sectarian demographics of Iraq.210 The council’s 25 members would 
include 13 Shi’a Arabs, 5 Sunni Arabs, 5 Kurds, a Turkoman, and a Christian.211 The 
quota system, in the establishment of the IGC, unknowingly “crystallized and reinforced 
identity politics (which naturally disadvantaged Sunnis) as the basis for the new Iraq.”212 
2005 would be a critical year that would exacerbate the divide between the Sunni and the 
Shi’a. Since the Sunnis boycotted the transitional parliamentary elections and attempted 
to vote down the Iraqi constitution, the Shi’a and the Kurds emerged dominant in the 
newly-elected Council of Representatives, President, Prime Minister, and cabinet 
positions.213 As a result of their diminished roles in the economic and political power 
structure of Iraq, the Sunnis would be driven toward the insurgency. Carter Malkasian 
would write in “Counterinsurgency in Iraq:” “They [the Sunnis] stood to gain more by 
waging war than accepting the outcome of the political process. The election of a 
legitimate government based on a Shi’a majority actually encouraged Sunnis to fight.”214 
The U.S. strategy of democratization would become a major contributing factor to 42% 
of Iraqis viewing the Iraqi government as illegitimate.215 
The other key elements of the U.S. strategy in Iraq, creation of a national army, 
would have important consequences for increased fractionalization and the perceived 
legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Prior to 2003, the Iraqi Army was viewed as a strong, 
patriotic institution that played a major role in the security of Iraq.216 Under Saddam, the 
security sector leadership was dominated by Sunnis who were viewed as trustworthy and 
reliable by the regime, particularly so in the elite military units such as the Republican 
Guard, Special Republican Guard, and the Fedayeen Saddam.217 It is important to 
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distinguish these units from what Oren Barak in “Dilemmas for Security in Iraq,” labeled 
“ordinary” army units who joined the army for more practical reasons such as a 
paycheck.218 This was evident during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s when Shi’a 
represented the majority of combat casualties within the Iraqi Army.219 The dissolution 
of the Iraqi Army in 2003 was precipitated by U.S. officials viewing all of the army as 
Saddam’s army and embarking on the strategy to build a new military: the Iraqi Security 
Forces.220 The effect of the dissolution of the old Iraqi Army and the de-Ba’athification 
policies became the primary ideology of the new Iraqi government. These policies had 
the unintended consequence of focusing on what the army was not (a Sunni force); rather 
than what is should be (an integrated force of Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurds) and significantly 
impacted the legitimacy and inclusion of Sunnis into the new Iraqi Security Forces.221 
Disenfranchised with the formation of new Shi’a-dominated political structure, the 
Sunnis were significantly underrepresented within the Iraqi Security Forces. Though 
Sunnis represented 20% of officers, they represented only 10% of enlisted personnel.222 
Barak underscored the importance of what he termed, “communal imbalance in Iraq’s 
security sector,” and its impact on the inclination of the Sunnis to participate 
politically.223 The disenfranchisement of the Sunnis based on the new Shi’a-dominated 
political and military structure drove many Sunnis, many who were in the old Iraqi Army, 
toward the insurgency. The disenfranchisement of the Sunnis against the Iraqi 
government precipitated the rise of Sunni insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and 
the corresponding rise in Shi’a militias and insurgent groups. These groups not only 
battled the U.S. and coalition forces in an attempt to gain control of Iraq, but also battled 
one another in what would be referred to as the Iraq civil war. In late 2006, the inclusion 
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of Sunnis into the Iraqi Security Forces would undergo significant change as a result of 
the sahwa movement and support their inclusion into the Iraqi political structure. 
The sahwa movement would be a critical turning point in the Iraqi political 
landscape through enabling Sunni inclusion into the Iraqi government against their 
common enemy: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The inclusion of Sunnis into the Iraqi political 
structures, including the ISF, would have a dramatic effect on the perceived legitimacy of 
the Iraqi government and succeed in dramatically decreasing violence and easing 
sectarian tensions.224 By 2006, the Iraqi civil war had taken a dramatic toll on the Sunni 
and Shi’a relations throughout Iraq. The Sunnis faced three challenges to their political 
and economic power: a perceived Iranian-supported Shi’a led government, a battle with 
U.S. forces for control of Anbar and Sunni provinces, and the Sunni-dominated AQI.225 
Partly attributed to the “surge” of U.S. forces into Iraq, the Sunnis began to view AQI as 
a greater threat because of its practice of bypassing the tribal and local power structures, 
the traditional sources of political and economic power in the Sunni areas.226 In addition 
to combating AQI, the Sunnis felt that if they were to continue battling the U.S.-
supported and Iranian-influenced Shi’a government, they would lose significant power 
and be confined to the resource poor western regions of Iraq.227 The sahwa movement 
would first be controlled by the U.S. as part of its negotiations between the sahwa forces 
and the Maliki government. In 2008, the U.S. would transfer responsibility of sahwa 
forces over to the Iraqi government who agreed to incorporate them into the ISF and 
government positions.228 The political success and reduction in violence through the 
incorporation of sahwa and Sunni elements into the ISF and Iraqi government would be 
short-lived. By 2012, despite negotiations between the U.S. and Maliki governments, 
Maliki would all but abandon Sunni inclusiveness into the Iraqi government and lay the 
ground work for the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq. 
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Politicization and corruption of the Iraqi Army under the Shi’a-dominated Maliki 
government would play a crucial role in the perception of political legitimacy of the Iraqi 
government. The Maliki government, in conjunction with the sahwa, made great strides 
in forming an inclusive government bringing all ethno-religious sects together and being 
viewed with greater legitimacy across all Iraqi communities. The reductions in violence 
that resulted from the surge and sahwa significantly contributed to the political 
stabilization in Iraq.229 In 2008, Maliki took two important steps to increase the 
perception of legitimacy in his government. The first was the successful March offensive 
to clear Basra of armed Shi’a factions and other militant groups caused many Sunnis and 
Kurds to see that Maliki was willing to battle armed groups, even if they were Shi’a.230 
The second key step undertaken by Maliki was the provincial powers law that gave 
expanded powers to provincial governing councils that included provincial legislation, 
regulations, and choosing governors and deputy governors.231 From 2008 through 2011, 
the Sunni-Shi’a civil war would come to an end and national and provincial elections 
would be held where “political parties abandoned the use of sectarian identities…and 
presented themselves to the public as non-sectarian and representative of all components 
of Iraqi society.”232 These steps made by all communities across Iraqi society, including 
the Maliki government, were tremendously positive measures that would signal the 
government and Iraqi Security Forces as being perceived as legitimate. However, 
beginning in 2011, the Maliki government would come under increasing pressure to end 
U.S. occupation of Iraq providing an opening for the re-emergence of the sectarian rift. 
2011 through 2014 would be a pivotal years in Iraq that included events that 
would challenge the legitimacy of the government and the Iraqi Security Forces and have 
a significant impact on the failures of the Iraqi Army and rise of the Islamic State. These 
factors included the failure of the U.S. and Iraqi governments to achieve a Status of 
Forces Agreement, Maliki’s failure to include the sahwa militiamen into the Iraqi 
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Security Forces, the arrest warrants issued for influential Sunni political leaders by 
Maliki, and the politicization and corruption of the Iraqi Army by Maliki. 
In 2011, the U.S. and Iraqi governments were unable to reach an agreement on a 
SOFA that would extend U.S. troop involvement in Iraq past 2011.233 The negotiations 
required to ratify the SOFA would require a ratification vote by the Iraqi COR.234 The 
Maliki government was able to gain support from most factions to extend U.S. presence; 
however, he was unable to gain support from the powerful Shi’a cleric Moqtada al Sadr, 
who threatened to reactivate his Mahdi militias to oppose any agreement on continued 
U.S. troop presence.235 In addition to the internal pressure to prevent the extension of 
U.S. troop presence, efforts to agree on a SOFA would be hampered by U.S. internal 
politics and possible Iranian influence. 
The Sunni militiamen, the Sons of Iraq (SOI), as part of the sahwa were folded up 
into the Iraqi Security Forces or given civil service positions within the Iraqi government. 
An official U.S. report in 2012 indicated that approximately 70,000 SOI fighters had been 
integrated into the ISF or been given civilian jobs; however, there are indications that 
many Sunnis have been “pushed out of their positions, marginalized, or not been 
paid.”236 According to a Congressional Research Service Report, only about two-thirds 
of the SOI have received the benefits promised as part of their integration into the ISF.237 
Although the exact number is unknown, many of these militiamen are believed to have 
become disillusioned with the Maliki government and joined the Islamic State.238 The 
failure of the Maliki government to follow through on his pledge to integrate SOI 
militiamen into the ISF coupled with a perceived expansion of Shi’a and Iranian 
influence, the Iraqi government was losing the credibility and legitimacy that it had 
worked so hard to build. 
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As a result of Maliki’s remerging divisive sectarian actions of the issuance of 
arrest warrants for numerous influential Sunni political leaders and the failure to fully 
integrate SOI militiamen into the ISF, the Sunni areas of Iraq would experience growing 
sectarian conflict. The anti-Maliki demonstrations and growing sectarian conflict would 
spread across Sunni areas in several provinces and within the Sunni districts in Baghdad 
to demand reform or repeal of antiterrorism and de-Ba’athification laws and improved 
government services.239 Maliki’s return to divisive sectarian rhetoric and actions would 
continue to deplete the perception of legitimacy of the Iraqi government by all 
communities in Iraq. 
The corruption and politicization of the Iraqi Army under Maliki have 
undermined the legitimacy of not only the Iraqi Army, but of the Iraqi government as a 
whole. Corruption, politicization, and nepotism have tremendously corrosive impacts on 
an army that relies on trusted leadership, discipline, and rule of law. The corruption and 
politicization of the Iraqi Army consisted of many different aspects. Maliki created the 
Office of the Commander-in-Chief (OCINC) to maximize civilian control of the military 
but in practice, used the office to facilitate the appointments of military officers based on 
personal loyalty in a coup-proofing scheme similar to the Saddam regime.240 The U.S. 
attempted to limit his powers, but was unable to sufficiently influence his actions through 
this office.241 According to the Congressional Research Service, “following the [U.S.] 
withdrawal, competent commanders were in some cases replaced by Maliki loyalists and 
many commanders viewed their positions as financial and political rewards.”242 Of the 14 
commanders appointed in April 2013, “11 were Shi’a, two were Sunni Arabs (one of 
whom was a staunch Maliki loyalist), and one a Kurd.”243 Former Multi-National 
Division-North Commanding General, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Mark Hertling 
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would be quoted as saying that Maliki had been “replacing good Sunni and Kurdish 
commanders with less capable Shi’a officers with ties to the Maliki government.”244 
The politicization and corruption of the Iraqi Army were clearly apparent in the 
collapse of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division in Mosul in June 2014 against the Islamic State. 
The politicization and corruption by Maliki as demonstrated through the removal and 
appointment of military officers based on personal loyalties established a precedence that 
filtered its way down to the lower levels of the Iraqi Army. In “Inside the Collapse of the 
Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division,” Yasir Abbas and Dan Trombly would characterize the 2nd 
Division as “undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained, due in large part to 
misallocated resources.”245 This misallocation of resources was directly attributed to the 
corruption and nepotism at all levels of the Iraqi Army. Corruption with the Iraqi Army 
consisted of embezzlement of money allocated to purchase food for the soldiers forcing 
them to use their own money to purchase food in the local markets, selling of designated 
military fuel on the black market, and the practice of reporting soldiers present for duty 
so that the leadership could pocket their salaries, a practice known as “ghost soldiers.”246 
These corrupt practices throughout the ranks of the Iraqi Army placed an additional 
burden on an already strained organization that dropped their weapons, vehicles, and 
uniforms and fled without barely a shot despite significant numerical superiority to the 
Islamic State in Mosul. 
Following the Islamic State’s offensive in the summer of 2014 that saw it gain 
control of large swaths of northern and western Iraq, Hayder al-Abaydi replaced the 
divisive Maliki as the Prime Minister of Iraq.247 The western-educated Al-Abaydi, who 
was exiled from Iraq during Saddam’s reign, pledged to practice more inclusive politics 
and reverse the divisive policies of Maliki.248 Al-Abaydi has attempted to deal with the 
underlying divisions in Iraqi society by reversing many of the policies of Maliki 
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including abolishment of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, public disclosure of 
government corruption, and amendments to the de-Ba’athification laws to reintegrate 
former regime members into the political process.249 His efforts are aimed at promoting a 
more inclusive political environment for which the Sunnis would take a bigger part and 
pull support away from the Islamic State. 
Despite the renewed efforts of al-Abaydi to heal the simmering sectarian divisions 
that remerged under Maliki, his efforts were hampered by the battle against the Islamic 
State. With the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul, the Shi’a militias were sent into 
battle in Sunni areas as the only viable alternative to the Islamic State. There have been 
unconfirmed reports of atrocities and human rights violations by these Shi’a militias 
against Sunni communities during fighting with the Islamic State that has fueled Sunni 
suspicions of al-Abaydi and the Iraqi government.250 In 2015, Shi’a militias, with Iranian 
advisors, captured the city of Tikrit from the Islamic State demonstrating that al-Abaydi 
remained heavily-dependent on the power of the Shi’a militias to battle the Islamic 
State.251 However, in December 2015, a reinvigorated Iraqi Army trained by U.S. 
advisors and supported by coalition air power, captured the Anbar capital of Ramadi from 
the Islamic State without the support of the Shi’a militias.252 The steps taken by al-
Abaydi to heal the sectarian divide and restore the perception of legitimacy among all 
communities in Iraq will be critical in the battle against the Islamic State. The recent 
success of the Peshmerga in the north and the Iraqi Security Forces in Ramadi suggest 
that his political reforms are having a significant positive impact in the battle against the 
Islamic State.253 
D. PREMISE TWO: LACK OF MOTIVATION AND WILL TO FIGHT 
A lack of motivation and a will to fight greatly contributed to the failures of the 
Iraqi Army in the face of the rapidly expanding Islamic State. The lack of motivation and 
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will to fight is not an assault on the bravery and willingness of the individual Iraqi soldier 
to go into battle against his enemy, but a criticism of for who they are willing to fight. In 
Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Chris Mason 
amplified this theory by writing: “In reality, there is nothing in Baghdad that the men of 
the Iraqi Army were going to fight and die for, made this outcome entirely predictable. It 
was a strategic repetition of South Vietnam.”254 By the time U.S. forces withdrew from 
Iraq in December 2011, the 350,000-man Iraqi Army was viewed as a “relatively well-
trained and disciplined force.”255 Through the time of the U.S. withdrawal, in concert 
with the sahwa and the growing perception of legitimacy of the Iraqi government across 
all communities of Iraqi society, the Iraqi Army was a force capable of providing security 
across the entire country. By the end of 2011, the Iraqi Army, through corruption and 
politicization, would begin to fractionalize and see the return of simmering sectarian and 
tribal divisions. Without the perception of a legitimate central government in Iraq, 
soldiers and civilians would return to tribal and local allegiances. An anonymous U.S. 
Marine Corps Colonel that served as an advisor team leader to the Iraqi Army would 
summarize this phenomenon by describing the loyalty of soldiers and leaders were first to 
their families, then to their tribes, and then to their religion.256 That Marine Colonel 
would further state, “Iraq as a nation falls at the bottom of the list [of loyalty]. Combine 
this with lack of cohesion, unity, loyalty, and camaraderie among themselves, and you 
have an organization that will disintegrate under pressure.”257 The collapse of the Iraqi 
Army against the Islamic State in Mosul was both a symptom and a cause of 
fractionalization and return to local and religious loyalties. 
The fractionalization of the army and decreasing perception of legitimacy of the 
Iraqi government, Iraqi soldiers would revert back to local, tribal, and religious loyalties. 
The reversion to ethno-religious loyalties, particularly after the summer 2014 Islamic 
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State offensive, were most visible in the reemergence and strength of Shi’a militias, the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Sunni to the Islamic State. 
The collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul would precipitate the reemergence of the 
Shi’a militias in the fight against the Islamic State. The Shi’a militias and Popular 
Mobilization Forces (PMFs) would halt the advance of the Islamic State to Baghdad, and 
by the end of 2015, would retake areas north of Baghdad, including the major cities of 
Tikrit and Baiji.258 Following the Islamic State’s seizure of Mosul in June 2014, Iraq’s 
top cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa to encourage Iraqis to “take up 
arms to defend their country and their people and their holy places.”259 In response to the 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who answered the call, the Iraqi government declared the 
establishment of the Popular Mobilization Forces.260 The PMFs, funded and given 
legitimacy by the Iraqi government, are viewed by the Sunnis as Shi’a militias that are 
sectarian agents of Iran.261 These PMFs have also been subject of allegations of abuses 
and human rights abuses against the citizens in Sunni areas while battling the Islamic 
State.262 The ethno-religious loyalties of the Shi’a militias was even acknowledged by al-
Abaydi in an interview with Spiegel saying that, “[the militias] are very powerful because 
they are ideologically motivated.”263 
The Kurds, integrated into the Iraqi Army and within the Peshmerga, are 
intensely loyal to the Kurdish Regional Government and have largely been successful in 
defending its territories from the Islamic State, including the recapture of Sinjar and 
Mosul Dam. The 2nd Division was the Iraqi Army unit stationed in Mosul and the 
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division in which the Kurdish Peshmerga were integrated.264 It is likely that a major 
contributing factor to the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul was due to internal 
divisions between the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds that contributed to the lack of 
coherence and unit of effort.265 Sarah Lord and Tony Ghazal Mouawad wrote: 
“Ultimately, the Kurds opted to defend their territories rather than try to defend other 
communities’ territories.”266 Kurdish forces have been successful in defending their 
territories while retaking territory lost to the Islamic State such as Sinjar and the Kirkuk 
oilfields.267 The collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul can be, at least partly, attributed to 
the priority the Kurds placed on ethno-religious loyalties over that of the nation of Iraq. 
The Sunni members of the Iraqi Army were in a tumultuous position because they 
were forced into the position to choose between the Islamic State and the Iraqi 
government viewed as illegitimate who did not represent Sunni interests. Many of the 
Sunni soldiers of the 2nd Division in Mosul lived with their families in the local area and 
upon threats from the Islamic State chose the safety of their families over that of fighting 
for the Iraqi government.268 These soldiers lacked the will to fight for the Shi’a-
dominated Iraqi central government they deemed as illegitimate because of corruption 
that left them without necessary resources, equipment and the inability to protect their 
families from the Islamic State.269 The Sunni in Anbar, Nineveh, and Saladin Provinces 
were forced to choose between the Islamic State and the perceived illegitimate Iraqi 
central government. Ethno-religious loyalties proved to rise the loyalty to tribe and 
religion over that of the nation and significantly contributed to their will to fight for the 
Iraqi Army. 
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In December 2015, Iraqi Security Forces and Sunni tribal fighters, trained by U.S. 
advisors and supported by U.S. airpower, recaptured Ramadi from the Islamic State.270 
The Iraqi Army victory in Ramadi would be a symbolic victory that would support the 
perceived legitimacy of the Iraqi government because the victory would be achieved 
without Shi’a tribal fighters.271 The reforms by al-Abaydi and the retaking of Ramadi 
without Shi’a militias was an important step to support the perception of legitimacy of the 
Iraqi government across all communities in addition to demonstrating that the Iraqi Army 
can defeat the Islamic State and provide security across Iraq. In an effort to further 
integrate the Sunni into the Iraqi central government and security forces, al-Abaydi 
approved the appointment of 40,000 Sunni fighters into the Popular Mobilization Forces 
in January 2016.272 According to the PMF spokesman, thousands of Sunni fighters have 
already joined the ranks in an effort to what al-Abaydi hopes will form the basis of the 
Iraqi National Guard.273 The measures taken by Al-Abaydi would be important steps 
toward political inclusion of the Sunni into the Iraqi government and peel away their 
support from the Islamic State. 
E. PREMISE THREE: AN ARMY IN OUR IMAGE, RATHER THAN AN 
ARMY SUITED FOR IRAQ 
De-Ba’athification and the dissolution of Saddam’s Iraqi Army forced the U.S. 
military to undertake building the new Iraqi Army from scratch. A key element of the 
U.S. strategy in Iraq was the construction of an integrated, national army “representative 
of Iraqi society at large…to transcend Iraq’s religious and ethnic boundaries and keep the 
country unified while fighting the insurgency.”274 As a result of de-Ba’athification laws 
and the dissolution of the Sunni-led old Iraqi Army in an effort to create a new integrated 
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Iraqi Army, the U.S. was unknowingly complicit in furthering the sectarian division. The 
U.S. military attempted to create a new Iraqi Army that was blind to the sect, ethnic, or 
religious backgrounds of its soldiers and to be representative of the society from which it 
comes.275 In an effort to create an integrated, national Iraqi Army in the image of western 
militaries, the U.S. military turned a blind eye toward the ethno-religious makeup of the 
new Iraqi Army which ultimately ended in the Iraqi Army being dominated by the 
Shi’a.276 The Counterinsurgency Field Manual named “to build and train host-nation 
security forces in the U.S. military’s image” in its list of unsuccessful counterinsurgency 
operational practices.277 The U.S. attempt to create an army without a careful analysis of 
the sectarian influences within the Iraqi state has led to critical vulnerabilities of the Iraqi 
Army. 
The U.S. military attempted to build an Iraqi Army in the image of the U.S. or 
western militaries where ethno-religious identities would not be a factor in the 
organization of the army. Through de-Ba’athification laws, dissolution of the old Iraqi 
Army, and the Sunni nature of the insurgency, the new Iraqi Army came to be dominated 
by the Shi’a.278 The U.S. failure to recognize and take steps to mitigate the sectarian 
divisions in the Iraqi Army has significantly impacted their effectiveness in maintaining a 
monopoly on violence within Iraq. In “Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict 
Societies,” Anne Marie Baylouny wrote: “The experience in Iraq demonstrates that when 
state security forces are viewed as controlled by a sect in a contentious ethnic, conflict-
ridden society, democracy and the functioning of that military across all segments of the 
state are compromised.”279 Baylouny further states: “Turning a blind eye to sect or 
religion when constituting a military will be counterproductive.”280 The U.S. military’s 
attempt to build an ethno-religiously blind army on the model of U.S. and western 
militaries severely crippled the effectiveness and sustainability of the Iraqi Army. The 
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sectarian realities of Iraq demanded that a determined effort be undertaken to ensure that 
a balance of sects would be achieved across all of the Iraqi Army. 
F. PREMISE FOUR: LACK OF LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGY AND 
COMMITMENT 
The U.S. military’s efforts to rebuild the Iraqi Army from scratch in the middle of 
a nation-building campaign and sectarian civil war required a long term strategy and 
commitment. The effort to rebuild the Iraqi Army was a key component of the 
counterinsurgency campaign to set the security conditions to support the establishment of 
a legitimate democratic government.281 Dr. Conrad Crane, lead author of the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, wrote, “COIN always requires considerable money, 
manpower, and time…critiques of the U.S. performance in COIN is an assumption that 
Americans have neither the patience nor the will required for success in protracted 
conflicts.”282 The high levels of commitment of manpower, resources, and time through 
2011, including the surge and the sahwa, achieved significant gains in the two key 
elements of U.S. strategy: democratization and construction of a national army. The U.S. 
departure in December 2011 would see the return of sectarian divisiveness and a 
deteriorating security situation that attributed to the rise of the Islamic State. 
U.S. military advisors to the Iraqi Army were the key element of the U.S. strategy 
to rebuild the Iraqi Army. Military advisors provided training and mentorship to their 
Iraqi partners that included skills ranging from small-unit urban tactics to logistics to staff 
planning processes.283 In addition to providing training and mentorship to the Iraqi 
Army, the advisors would also provide key enabler support such as close air support; 
medical evacuation; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support.284 
With U.S. advisor support through 2011, the Iraqi Army would perform reasonably well 
and was capable of providing security across Iraq. The successful offensive in Basra 
                                                 
281 Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 250–51. 
282 Conrad C. Crane, “Minting COIN: Principles and Imperatives for Combating Insurgency,” Air and 
Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (2007): 59. 
283 From the author’s personal experience as an advisor to the Iraqi Army in Haditha, Iraq. 
284 From the author’s personal experience as an advisor to the Iraqi Army in Haditha, Iraq. 
 68
against the Shi’a militias in 2008 would demonstrate that the Iraqi Army, with U.S. 
advisors and support, was capable of conducting military operations under the direction 
of the Iraqi central government. It was noted that during the Basra operation, the Iraqi 
Army units with U.S. advisors performed better than those without U.S. advisors.285 
Stephen Biddle in “How to Leave a Stable Iraq” wrote: the First and 26th Brigades, 
“deployed with Marine advisors, performed well, whereas the brigades without U.S. 
advisors and partners did poorly, with one effectively collapsing in combat.” Biddle 
would further conclude that the Basra campaign “would have ended in disaster if not for 
support from coalition firepower and the arrival of ISF with U.S. military and police 
training teams.”286 Despite the critical support of U.S. advisors and coalition firepower, 
the Basra campaign was a significant victory that facilitated the perception of legitimacy 
of the Iraqi central government because it demonstrated that it was willing to battle the 
sectarian militias. It further demonstrated when properly advised and supported, Iraqi 
Army units were capable of conducting operations that provided a secure and stable 
environment for the fledgling Iraqi central government. The sudden departure of U.S. 
advisors and support in December 2011 would have drastic consequences on the Iraqi 
Army. 
In 2011, the U.S. and Iraqi governments were unable to reach a consensus on the 
SOFA that would extend U.S. presence and guarantee immunity of U.S. forces from Iraqi 
law.287 The SOFA would fail because of domestic politics in both Iraq and the U.S. The 
powerful Shi’a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, would be adamantly opposed to further U.S. 
presence and would pressure the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government to refuse to sign the 
SOFA.288 The domestic politics of the U.S. would play a role in the failure of a SOFA 
largely due to President Obama fulfilling a campaign pledge to end the war in Iraq.289 
The sudden departure of U.S. forces and advisors resulted in the increased politicization 
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and corruption of the Iraqi Army.290 With U.S. advisors present throughout the Ministry 
of Defense down to the battalion levels, they were able to stem the tide of this 
politicization and corruption through oversight and cooperation.291 The departure of U.S. 
advisors within the Iraqi Army increased the politicization and corruption within the 
Maliki-controlled army and contributed directly to its deterioration post-2011. Anthony 
Cordesman in “Iraqi Force Development,” echoed the need for a commitment based on 
conditions, not time, when he wrote: “The goal should not be to rush U.S. forces out of 
Iraq as soon as possible without regard to the realities of Iraqi force development and the 
political conditions and levels of civil violence under which the ISF must develop and 
operate.”292 The US’s strategy and commitment of manpower and resources was driven 
by time and not conditions. The lack of a long term strategy and commitment to fully 
support the key elements of U.S. strategy in Iraq, democratization and construction of a 
national army, were detrimental and ultimately contributed to the failure of the Iraqi 
Army and the ability to maintain an inclusive government viewed as legitimate across all 
communities of Iraq. 
G. CONCLUSION 
From 2003 to 2011, the United States and coalition partners undertook an 
immense military advisory effort to rebuild the Iraqi Army following the toppling of the 
Saddam Hussein regime. The U.S. spent $20 billion on the construction of the Iraqi Army 
in an attempt to create an integrated national force loyal to a legitimate central 
government and capable of providing security under the rule of law across all 
communities in Iraq. The collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul in June 2014 against 
numerically inferior forces of the Islamic State demonstrated the Iraqi Army was not 
capable of defending Iraq from internal or external threats. 
This chapter has sought to explain why, despite an immense military advisory 
effort and $20 billion spent on recruiting, training, and equipping the Iraqi Army, the 
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Iraqi Army has failed to secure Iraq against the Islamic State. There are four key premises 
as to why the Iraqi Army has not met the expectations of a sustainable and legitimate 
central army: failure to achieve legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation and will to 
fight, creation of an army in the western image rather than an army that meets the needs 
of Iraq, and the lack of a long-term U.S. strategy and commitment. 
The experience in Iraq has provided critical lessons to military and strategic 
planners engaging in military operations that require large-scale military advisory efforts 
as part of nation-building or counterinsurgency campaign. The first and most important 
lesson is that the strategy must be developed with a thorough understanding of the 
historical context and the realities of Iraq. The U.S. sought to impose a representative 
democracy in a country that had a deep sectarian divide as a result of decades of 
oppression under the Saddam regime. The U.S. was unknowingly complicit in widening 
this sectarian divide through the de-Ba’athification laws and the dissolution of the old 
Iraqi Army. A more careful review of the history of Iraq and the realities of the sectarian 
divide might have resulted in a more cohesive strategy for democratization and the 
construction of an integrated, national army. A second critical lesson learned is despite 
significant time and resources invested; an outside force cannot build a strong central 
army capable of providing a secure and stable environment if the government is not 
viewed as legitimate and worth fighting and dying for. The third critical lesson learned is 
that the military advisory mission is an extremely important mission that advances the 
capacity and capability of partnered or allied nations, but military and strategic planners 
must understand the limitations of what can be achieved. The military advisor is capable 
of providing training and capabilities to partners and allies in support of the national 
strategy, but the military advisor cannot build an army from scratch if the government it 
serves is viewed as illegitimate by the soldiers and the populace nor can the advisor give 
it the motivation and will to fight. 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The two case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan offer unique insight into the U.S. 
military’s mission to rebuild the national army following the collapse of the existing 
central government. In both cases, the U.S. military was assigned the mission to rebuild 
the national army and a strong, democratically-elected central government while the 
country was embroiled in a violent insurgency with internal and external actors and 
influences. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military was assigned the task of re-
building a national army that was loyal to the democratically-elected central government 
and capable of defending their countries from internal and external threats. 
In both of these examples, the U.S. military would have to rebuild the army from 
scratch. In Afghanistan prior to 9/11, Guistozzi described the ANA as “essentially an 
irregular militia under the orders of charismatic warrior mullahs,” who had been 
appointed by and were directly responsible to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar rather than 
to the Ministry of Defense.293 Guistozzi would also write that the formal structure of the 
ANA “dissolved between 1992–3 and its units in the provinces were taken over by local 
coalitions of former insurgents.”294 The rapid collapse of the Taliban government and its 
security force structure as a result of the U.S. and coalition invasion in 2001, left the 
U.S.-led coalition with the task to rebuild the ANA from scratch. In Iraq, following the 
defeat of the Iraqi Army and collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, the Iraqi Army 
would have to be rebuilt as a result of Coalition Provisional Orders 1 (de-Ba’athification) 
and 2 (dissolution of the old Iraqi Army). Prior to 2003, the Iraqi Army was a large, 
relatively well-trained and equipped national army loyal to the Saddam Hussein 
government. The Iraqi Army was built by Saddam as a coup-proofing force consisting of 
a conscript and volunteer regular army and a better trained and equipped Republican 
Guard force and intelligence apparatus to ensure regime survival. With the 
implementation of CPA 1 and 2, the U.S. military, like Afghanistan, would be tasked to 
rebuild the Iraqi Army from scratch. 
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In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military expended tremendous resources 
and human capital in the construction of national armies; however, following the 
departure of U.S. and coalition forces, neither army has proved capable of maintaining 
loyalty to the central government and defending its country from internal and external 
threats. Afghanistan has seen a reemergence of the Taliban and a growing threat from the 
Islamic State that has resulted in significant ANA attrition and the loss of numerous cities 
and districts. The collapse of the Iraq Army in Nineveh, Saladin, and Anbar provinces at 
the hands of significantly numerically-inferior forces of the Islamic State demonstrated 
the inability to defend Iraq from both internal and external threats. In both cases, ANA 
and Iraqi Army forces have made slight gains in their efforts to regain territory lost to the 
Taliban and the Islamic State. These gains have largely been attributed to U.S. and 
coalition air, logistics, and intelligence support. In the case of Iraq, the Iraqi Army has 
also found support from the Shi’a and Sunni militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, and advisors 
from the United States and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
This thesis has sought to explain the failures of the Iraqi and Afghan armies 
because of four premises: the failure to achieve legitimacy of governance, lack of 
motivation and will to fight, creation of an army in the western image, and lack of a long-
term U.S. strategy and commitment. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, these four premises 
provide explanation to why the U.S. military was unable to construct a national army loyal 
to the central government and able to defend the country from internal and external threats.  
The failure to achieve legitimacy of governance was a major factor in the failures of 
both the Iraqi and Afghan armies. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the efforts to rebuild the 
army and the central government were carried out concurrently with the conduct of a 
counterinsurgency campaign. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that “the primary 
objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a 
legitimate government.”295 The Counterinsurgency Field Manual further states that a 
government viewed as legitimate can best manage the security, political, economic, and 
social development efforts of the country.296 As a critical element of the central 
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government’s efforts for security and stability, the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the population and the soldiers is a key aspect of the national armies of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, significant portions of the society did not view 
the central governments as legitimate. In Afghanistan, the U.S. imposition of a strong, 
democratically-elected central government was not viewed as legitimate in a society whose 
only culturally accepted sources of legitimacy are traditional (dynastic or hereditary) and 
religious. The U.S. efforts to create a strong, central government failed to achieve a balance 
between the bottom-up power of the local and tribal leaders and the top down power of the 
national government. The failure to achieve legitimacy of governance in Iraq stems from 
democratization and de-Ba’athification that led to the fractionalization of Iraqi society 
following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The dissolution of the old Iraqi Army, de-
Ba’athification, and democratization of the Iraqi government facilitated the rise to power 
by the Shi’a majority and led to the marginalization and political exclusion of the Sunni 
Arab minority. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the politicization and pervasive corruption 
within the army and the central government were significant contributing factors to the 
perception of legitimacy by both the soldiers and the population it is supposed to serve. 
Motivation and will to fight had a major impact on the failures of both the Afghan 
and Iraqi Armies. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the individual soldier was not willing to 
fight and die for a central government that they viewed as illegitimate and did not 
represent the various ethno-sectarian elements of the society. The motivation and will to 
fight is linked to the failure of both governments to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people. In Afghanistan, the ANA would not be willing to fight for a government viewed 
as illegitimate and corrupt. The soldier’s perception of the Afghan government and of the 
leadership within the ANA has significantly contributed to an attrition rate from 3% in 
October 2015 to 3.4% in January 2016.297 In Guistozzi’s “Army of Afghanistan,” he 
wrote that among the reasons for desertion are corruption among officers, poor medical 
care and neglect of soldiers and their families, service in remote locations away from 
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their ethno-sectarian region, and the uncertainties of ISAF departure.298 Like 
Afghanistan, elements within the Iraqi Army suffered from a lack of motivation and will 
to fight. The lack of motivation and will to fight had its roots in the de-Ba’athification 
and democratization process that exacerbated the fractionalization of Iraqi society along 
ethno-sectarian lines. This lack of motivation and will to fight was not so much a 
question of bravery, but for whom they are willing to fight. The three main ethno-
sectarian groups that formed the Iraqi government and Iraqi Army each had greater 
loyalties to their family, tribe, and religion than they did to the nation and the Iraqi central 
government. This division of loyalties was made clear with the collapse of the Iraqi Army 
2nd Division in the face of the 2014 Islamic State offensive in Mosul. The 2nd Division, 
made up primarily of Sunni Arabs and Kurds, collapsed virtually overnight when the 
soldiers chose the security of their families, tribes, and ethnic group over that of the Iraqi 
government. The effectiveness of the Kurdish Peshmerga and Shi’a militias in the battle 
against the Islamic State are examples of the motivation and will to fight for an entity that 
is perceived as legitimate and representative of the people: the governments of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi central government, and the Shi’a religious 
leadership in Iraq. The politicization and corruption of the Iraqi Army leadership by the 
Maliki government was an additional contributing factor to the perceived illegitimacy of 
the Iraqi central government. 
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual named “to build and train host-nation 
security forces in the U.S. military’s image” in its list of unsuccessful counterinsurgent 
operational practices.299 In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military attempted to 
construct and sustain national armies without a careful analysis of the society, culture, 
capabilities, and resources of the society from which it is drawn. In Afghanistan, the U.S. 
attempt to create an army without a careful analysis of the capabilities and resources of 
the Afghan state has led to critical vulnerabilities of the ANA. The critical vulnerabilities 
that have resulted in the creation and sustainment of the ANA by U.S. and NATO forces 
are the budget and funding of the ANA, adequate numbers of sufficiently educated and 
                                                 
298 Giustozzi, Army of Afghanistan, 161. 
299 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 1–29. 
 75
skilled manpower to meet the needs of the ANA, and a logistics and equipment 
sustainability system to support the ANA nationwide. In Iraq, a major shortfall of the 
U.S. strategy to construct a new Iraqi Army resulted from the attempt to build an 
integrated, national army blind to religious and ethnic identities like that of a modern 
western army. As a result of de-Ba’athification laws and dissolution of the Sunni-led old 
Iraqi Army in an effort to create a new integrated Iraqi Army, the U.S. was unknowingly 
complicit in furthering the sectarian division. The U.S. failed to recognize and take steps 
to mitigate the ethno-sectarian divisions that resulted from the dissolution of the old Iraqi 
Army and De-Ba’athification laws. As a result of sectarian fractionalization, the new 
Iraqi Army became characterized as an overwhelmingly Shi’a force not inclusive of the 
Sunni and Kurdish sects within its ranks.300 The sectarian realities of Iraq demanded that 
a determined effort be undertaken to ensure a balance of sects across all of the Iraqi Army 
and support it being viewed as legitimate and representative of Iraqi society. 
The lack of long-term U.S. strategy and commitment had a significant impact on 
the construction, sustainment, and capabilities of the Iraqi and Afghan armies. FM 3–24 
emphasizes that one of the historical principles of a counterinsurgency is to be prepared 
for a long-term commitment.301 The counterinsurgency operations and efforts to rebuild 
the Iraqi and Afghan armies required a long-term commitment of manpower and 
resources. Timelines, rather than performance or capability milestones, often driven by 
U.S. domestic politics, had a significant impact on the governments and armies of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. In both cases, the level of commitment of U.S. resources were based on 
time and not on conditions. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the armies achieved higher 
levels of proficiency and success on the battlefield with embedded military advisors than 
those without, particularly with enablers such as close air support, logistics, and 
intelligence support. Excellent examples of this are the 2008 Basra campaign in Iraq and 
the 2015 operation to retake Kunduz in Afghanistan. The success of these operations 
relied heavily on U.S. enabler support, particularly close air support, logistics, and 
intelligence. The success of the Iraqi and Afghan armies to provide a secure and stable 
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environment are critical to support the perception of legitimacy of the central 
governments. The strategy in Afghanistan suffered from incrementalism that began as 
counter-terrorism then progressed to counterinsurgency, and then ended with the nation-
building strategy of “Afghanization.” With varying levels of commitment of resources 
and manpower, the war in Afghanistan was an economy of force mission to that of Iraq. 
Varying levels of commitment and a drawdown timeline for U.S. military involvement in 
Afghanistan produces uncertainty in the Afghan people in the army and government’s 
ability to maintain security and stability. In Iraq, the domestic politics of both Iraq and 
the U.S. contributed to preventing a long-term commitment of U.S. advisors and enabler 
support. The failure of the U.S. and Iraqi governments to achieve a Status of Forces 
Agreement can be attributed to U.S., Iraqi, and Iranian politics. A long-term commitment 
of U.S. advisors and support would have enabled the continued strengthening of the Iraqi 
government and military institutions and would likely have been able to stem the tide of 
politicization and corruption through oversight and cooperation.302 The lack of a long 
term strategy and commitment to fully support the key elements of U.S. strategy in Iraq 
and Afghanistan were detrimental and contributed to the failures of the Iraqi and Afghan 
armies and the ability to maintain an inclusive government. In both case studies of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the U.S. was tasked to build a national army and democratic 
government from scratch following the collapse of the central government in the midst of 
a violent insurgency. The similarities of the mission and of the outcome in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan provide important insight into the military advisor mission and the mission 
to rebuild a national army as part of a nation-building strategy. Failure to achieve 
legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation and will to fight, creation of an army in the 
western image, and lack of long-term U.S. strategy and commitment are common 
principles that support the primary shortfalls of the nation-building mission in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The four premises addressed in the case study provide an explanation as 
to why the U.S. military has failed to build a national army that is capable of defending 
Iraq and Afghanistan from internal and external threats under the control of the national 
government. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
CONFLICTS 
Since 2001, the U.S. military endeavored to rebuild the national armies of both 
Afghanistan and Iraq following the toppling of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes. 
As of January 2016, $38.6 billion has been spent recruiting, training, and equipping the 
160,000 soldiers of the Afghan National Army and Air Force.303 At the time of the U.S. 
departure from Iraq in December 2011, $20 billion had been spent recruiting, training, 
and equipping the 350,000 soldiers of the Iraqi Army. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
neither of the national armies are sustainable forces loyal to the central government 
capable of defending their territories from internal and external threats. In Afghanistan, 
71% of the country’s districts are under Afghan government control leaving the other 
29% to be under control or influence of the Taliban or the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant–Khorasan.304 In Iraq, the Islamic State maintains control over large swaths of 
territory in northern and western Iraq including Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. By 
February 2016, Iraqi forces have succeeded in retaking Tikrit, Sinjar, Baiji, and Ramadi; 
however, this success can be attributed to a mix of Shi’a and Sunni militias, Kurdish 
Peshmerga, Iraqi Army, and coalition air power, not a unified Iraqi Army under the 
control of the Iraqi central government.305 
The purpose of this paper has been to explain why despite nearly $60 billion and 
more than a decade of military advisory efforts, the Iraqi and Afghan national armies are 
not unified, sustainable forces loyal to the central government and capable defending 
their territories from internal and external threats. The selection, training, organization, 
and deployment of combat advisors by the U.S. military has faced numerous challenges 
during the recent advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; including poor quality of 
indigenous recruits, inadequate advisor screening and selection, inadequate pre-
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deployment training, language and cultural barriers, and command and control issues.306 
These shortfalls however, are insufficient to explain why the Iraqi Army has failed 
against the Islamic State and the ANA are losing ground to a resurgent Taliban and the 
growing threat from ISIL-K. There are four key premises as to why the Iraqi and Afghan 
armies have not met the expectations of a sustainable and legitimate central army: failure 
to achieve legitimacy of governance, lack of motivation and will to fight, the creation of 
an army in the western image rather than an army that meets the needs of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the lack of a long-term U.S. strategy and commitment. 
The experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has provided critical lessons to military 
and strategic planners engaging in military operations that require large-scale military 
advisory efforts as part of nation-building or counterinsurgency campaigns. The first and 
most important lesson is that the strategy must be developed with a thorough 
understanding of the historical context and the realities. We must endeavor for a thorough 
understanding of the cultural and political landscape of the country for which we are 
providing support. Any attempt to build an army must first begin with an understanding 
of the cultural landscape, resources, capabilities, and limitations of the host country. We 
must build a national army not in the western image, but in a manner that meets the needs 
and resources of the country it serves. In Iraq, the U.S. sought to impose a representative 
democracy in a country with a deep sectarian divide as a result of decades of oppression 
under the Saddam regime in the midst of a violent sectarian civil war. The U.S. was 
unknowingly complicit in widening this sectarian divide through de-Ba’athification laws 
and the dissolution of the old Iraqi Army. A more careful review of the history of Iraq 
and the realities of the sectarian divide may have resulted in a more cohesive strategy for 
democratization and the construction of an integrated national army. The strategy in 
Afghanistan also sought to impose a representative democracy centered on a strong 
central government that did not respect the Afghan history and culture of local and tribal 
governance based on traditional and religious sources of legitimacy. The historical 
context of Afghan governance and its relation with society is highlighted by Thomas 
Johnson in “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban Transition.” Johnson wrote, “Past attempts at 
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modern state formation in Afghanistan that have directly challenged the local tribal and 
religious structures of society have resulted in ethnic backlash and state failure.”307 A 
second critical lesson learned is despite significant time and resources invested; an 
outside force cannot build a strong central army capable of providing a secure and stable 
environment if the government is not viewed as legitimate and worth fighting and dying 
for. The military advisory mission is an extremely important mission that advances the 
capacity and capability of partnered or allied nations, but military and strategic planners 
must understand the limitations of what can be achieved. The military advisor is capable 
of providing training and enabling capabilities to partners and allies in support of the 
national strategy, but the military advisor cannot build an army from scratch if the 
government it serves is viewed as illegitimate by the soldiers and the populace nor can 
the advisor give it the motivation and will to fight. The advised military can use the 
advisor and the enabler support as a source of motivation and will to fight, but it will not 
likely outlast the uncoupling of the military advisor with their partnered military. The 
third key lesson is that for the military advisor mission to increase its likelihood of 
success, we must be prepared for a long-term commitment in both time and resources. 
There is evidence to support that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, those units that retained 
military advisors and their enabler support (close air support, intelligence, logistics, etc.) 
performed better than those without. The cases of the Iraqi Army during the Basra 
campaign and the success of the Afghan National Security Forces during recent 
operations in Kunduz support this thesis. U.S. military advisors were relatively successful 
in limiting the politicization and corruption among the Iraqi and Afghan armies while 
they were still embedded with their partnered units. Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla in 
Afghan Endgames echoed the historical principle of COIN, prepare for a long-term 
commitment, by stating that “long term commitment would undermine our enemies’ 
belief that time is on their side.”308 
The exploration of the military advisor mission is an important study of what can 
be achieved in the enabling the capacity and capabilities of our allies and partners as part 
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of the U.S. national security strategy. The missions to rebuild the Iraqi and Afghan 
armies provide examples of the capabilities and limitations of the military advisor 
mission and a more thorough understanding of what this mission can achieve. The U.S. 
military’s mission to rebuild the Iraqi and Afghan armies from scratch in the midst of a 
nation-building adventure overlooked the societal, organizational, and institutional 
weaknesses in the government and society for which the central army is a critical 
element. In short, the U.S. government built the teeth before it built the tail. 
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